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ABSTRACT 
Network Management (NM) is concerned with reducing complexity and managing cost. 
The traditional NM tools and techniques are based on the Open System Interconnection 
(OSI) NM model. However, several drawbacks have been identified when managing a 
network using traditional NM tools (Sarkar & Verma, 2001). 
Network security is a major issue when managing a network. Even though the 
technology assists to reduce security risks, unless properly managed, the security 
measures may not do the job as expected. 
The State Model (SM) diagram is a new method, which may assists in managing the 
network. This new method may provide functionality not currently offered by current 
NM tools. Furthermore it may be possible to integrate the SM with NM tools. SM 
diagrams integrate relevant output from devices with protocol finite state information by 
means of tables. The diagrams are modu]ar and hierarchical thereby providing top down 
decomposition by means of levelling. Furthermore, their modular, hierarchical 
characteristics allow technical detail to be introduced in an integrated and controlled 
manner. 
The State Model Diagrams were evaluated as a network management tool by twenty 
participants. The results clearly demonstrated that these diagrams could be of value not 
only as a NM tool but also as a tool for network security management. 
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1.1 Background to the study 
Network Management 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Deri, L. (1996, para 1) states that, "The increasing complexity and heterogeneity of 
modem networks has pushed industry and research towards a single and consistent way 
of managing networks". In general, network management is a service that employs a 
wide variety of software and hardware products to assist network system administrators 
in monitoring and maintaining networks. Due to heavy demands for quick and efficient 
telecommunication services, active telephone network management first began in the 
mid-1920s with the establishment of regional Traffic Control Bureaus in Chicago, 
Cleveland and New York. These bureaus served as clearinghouses for all information 
affecting traffic over their portion of the network. Staff implemented management plans 
for coping with unusual calling patterns, weather, damaged lines or other emergency 
situations. The structure of these early network management systems have influenced 
current computer network management (AT&T., 2005). 
Most network management architectures use the same basic structure and set of 
relationships (Figure-1). Computer systems and other network devices run software that 
enable them to send alerts when they recognize problems. When receiving these alerts, 
management entities are programmed to react by executing one, several, or a group of 
actions, including operator notification, event logging, system shutdown, and automatic 
attempts at system repair (Cisco Systems, 2002). 
,. ' -·--,.-·- --·�·----..--- -�-- -·
Figure 1: A Typical N�twork Management Architecture Maintains Many Relationships.
(Cisco Systems, 2002, p. 2) 
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However, many organizations did not take NM seriously until the development of 
computer networks in the early 1980s. In 1998, a group of telecommunication vendors 
combined to come to an agreement on simplified specifications that could speed up the 
implementation of Open System Interconnection (OSI) management standards and 
reduce the difficulty involved in the NM of computer networks (Raman, 1998). 
Network Security 
Network security is the protection of networks and their services from unauthorized 
modification, destruction, or admission (Information Assurance Division, 2004). 
Protection methods help to stop unauthorized users from accessing any part of the 
network system. It guarantees that a network performs its critical functions correctly. 
According to Bose, (cited in 3COM Corporation, 2005, para. 5): 
Security must permeate the entire network, not just at key points -- which tends 
to leave much of the network and its various points of connection unguarded and 
untouched. Furthermore, key points of vulnerability and threats that have 
multiple means of propagation require an integrated response from more than 
one type of security technology, in essence requiring a multi-layered protection. 
Clearly, multiple layers of protection across the whole network are essential if the 
integrity of the network is to be protected. Furthermore, according to Brahce, ( cited in 
Kammerer, 2005, para 16) "Security is really a balance of security versus access". The 
challenge is to manage the correct level of security and access. 
In current network security management, a common mistake 1s to assume that 
protection is just a matter of having the right security products and infrastructure. 
According to Stoiler (2005, para. 3), 
The marketing literature that goes along with the firewalls, anti-virus software 
and VPNs (virtual private networks) certainly give the impression that once the 
product is installed, all will be well. But the real challenges lurking beneath the 
surface are people issues, not technology issues. 
Even though the technology assists to reduce security risks, unless properly managed, 
the security software may not do the job as expected. Therefore the only safe solution is 
to ensure that employees maintain and manage network security properly. This can be 
done by ensuring the security devices are configured properly, ongoing monitoring of 
the network and patches are consistently installed and updated (Stoller, 2005). 
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State Model Diagrams 
The State Model (SM) diagrams were designed to provide network students with a 
conceptual model to maximize their understanding of the network. There is evidence 
that it can also be used for managing security firewalls (Maj & Kohli, 2004). Work to 
date indicates that it is diagrammatic, allowing network administrators to have .a 
complete picture of the network and to view the physical as well as logical network 
topologies. The model employs multiple views, and hence provides a hierarchical top 
down decomposition, thereby controlling technical detail. This new SM diagrams may 
integrate with NM tools, therefore network administrators may have a better 
understanding of networking devices and view of the network. Hence, SM may lead to 
efficient NM. 
1.2 Purpose of the study 
Network management software gives centralized control of the network components to 
the network administrator which helps to increase the physical control of the network. 
Managing a network through traditional NM tools is generally automatic and not 
defensive. The problems are rectified and the network manager only becomes aware of 
the problem after seeing the effect on a specific service. By this time half the damage is 
already done (Sarkar & Verma, 2001). 
Biswas ( cited in Sarkar & Verma, 2001, para. 5) says "The biggest drawback of several 
NM solutions available on the market is that while most tools support a good breadth of 
devices, they lack the depth to which they can manage or monitor a device". Since more 
applications are being implemented over networks, each with their own unique 
requirements from the network, the devices have to be modified to perform optimally in 
demanding and critical environments. In order to use the same tools all over the 
network, network administrators require tools that give them depth of management. 
According to Maj, Murphy and Kohli (2004), many network administrators use the 
Command Line Interface (CLI) to manage their network devices. In order to determine 
device (router etc) states a number of different CLI commands must be used. The 
complexity of the CLI affects the learning phase for novices, resulting in a lack of 
ability to use it to manage most of the network devices (Maj & Kohli, 2004). With a 
good network and system analyser, network administrators may know exactly what 
traffic is on the network and precisely how the applications and systems are used. A 
good network and system analyser allows managers and operators to visualise and 
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respond to service availability trends in real time. This research will investigate whether 
the State Model diagrams can use for successful NM. 
1.3 Hypothesis 
State Model diagrams assist m network security management and lead to more 
comprehensive network management. 
1.4 Research Questions 
1. What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of current network management
tools?
2. Does the State Model diagram assist m network security management to
simplify the complexity of the networks and as a result leads to more efficient
network management?
3. Can the State model be integrated into a vendor based system to simplify
network management?
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 General literature 
Network Management 
In order to guarantee sufficient levels of performance and reliability, computer and 
communication systems require increasingly more complicated management strategies. 
IT departments are under increasing pressure when the network is at risk from outside 
threats such as viruses or software audits (Novell Releases ZENworks 7, 2005). 
The rapid expansion of net-based business communications is driving larger amounts of 
different types of traffic over increasingly complex enterprise infrastructures. 
Unfortunately, NM budgets are not increasing at a rate that is comparative with this 
increase in traffic or the challenge of managing these more complex network 
environments. Also there are not enough skilled people available to solve current NM 
problems (Liebmann, 2000). Hence, the deployments of efficient NM tools are more 
critical than ever. 
The monitoring tools can be simple or complicated. However, they are all likely to be 
simple to access and use. When there is a bad network link, there is no time to spend on 
complex analysis or complicated tools when the major concern is to get the systems 
back on line quickly (Cohen, 2002). 
Tyminski ( cited in Lais & Sarni, 2000) comments on NM: 
I figured out that to manage systems just for one of the data centres, you'd need 
to watch 18 separate consoles. An alarm could flash across the screen, and 
unless you happened to be watching that monitor at that moment, you'd miss it. 
(p. 8) 
Hence, complexity and incompatibility are the foundation of most NM problems in 
modem corporate networks. The complexity is created when any hardware addition 
increases the points of potential network failure. Incompatibility occurs when IT 
hardware is not carefully inventoried and placed inappropriately and indelicately on the 
network. This scenario allows the administrator to see the status of all systems in real 
time and all on a single console (Lais & Sarni, 2000). However, building a flexible and 
dynamic NM platform upon which complicated management functions can guarantee 
uninterruptible, high-quality services is very difficult (Jingsha & Yi-Shang, 1995). 
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Kahani and Beadle point out that there are three basic approaches for NM systems; 
centralised,. hierarchical and distributed. Most NM systems are centralised. Therefore, 
only a single management machine which is a single point of failure can collect the 
information and controls the entire network. If it fails, the entire network may collapse. 
If the management host does not fail, but a fault partitions the network, the other part of 
the network is left without any management functionality. In addition, a centralised 
system cannot easily be extended when the size or complexity of the network increase 
(Kahani & Beadle, 1997). 
Network Management Models 
Several NM models have been developed to date. Popular NM models are: 
1. OSI Network Management
2. Telecommunications Management Networks
3. OMNIPoint theory
4. IT Infrastructure Library
5. Tasks--Frame of reference
6. DUneT Management Model (Hemmen, 2000).
OSI Network Management 
The International Organization for Standardization network management model, Open 
System Interconnection (OSI), is the primary means for understanding the major 
functions of �1vf systems. There are three basic components that comprise the elements 
of the management architecture to support a successful NM environment: a functional 
component, an information component and a communication component. The 
functional component describes the various activities to be performed in support of 
management. This component consists of five theoretical areas which facilitate rapid 
and consistent progress on each category in individual areas. These are configuration, 
fault, .Performance, security and accounting management. The information component 
explains how the management information is exchanged between the managing and 
managed systems. In order to enable successful transfer and interpretation of 
management information, the communication component addresses support 
infrastructure capabilities (Raman, 1998). 
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The traditional diagram that explains the manager and agent roles (Figure 2), presents a 
view that includes the three components mentioned above. The functional component is 
the alarm surveillance. The communication component is addressed by requests and 
responses, while the information component is represented by managed resources 
(Raman, 1998). 
Figure 2: OSI systems management overview. 
(Raman, 1998, p. 47). 
However, Tanenbaum (cited in OSI Model, n.d.) argues that the OSI protocol 1s 
inappropriate because, 
... the failure of the OSI suite to become popular was due to bad timing, bad 
technology, bad implementations, and bad politics. The timing was bad because 
the model was finished only after a significant amount of research time and 
money had been spent on the TCP/IP model. The technology is "bad" because 
the session and presentation layers are nearly empty, whereas the data link layer 
is overfilled. Early implementations were notoriously buggy and in the early 
days, OSI became synonymous with poor quality, whereas early 
implementations of TCP/IP were more reliable. Finally, the politics were bad 
because TCP/IP was closely associated with Unix, making it popular in 
academia, whereas OSI did not have this association. (para. 31) 
Telecommunications Management Networks (TMN). 
TMN is an important development in the telecommunication service providers' world. 
In large distributed telecommunications networks fault, configuration, accounting, 
performance, and security services are all significant elements of managing critical 
resources. The TMN concepts have been commonly implemented to manage networks 
ranging from high-speed fiber-optic networks to distributed cellular and satellite based 
wireless communication systems (Telecommunications Management Networks, n.d.). 
In order to provide an organization with management services, TMN uses a five layer 
hierarchy of services. These layers include: 
11-08)
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• Business Management
• Service Management
• Network Management
• Element Management
• Network Element (Telecommunications Management Networks, n.d.).
TMN describes the NM architecture in more detail than the OSI model. The NM 
architecture is expanded in the TMN model, where the OSI functional areas are used to 
define one of the four layers (Hemmen, 2000). However, the TMN model addresses the 
functions within a discipline, such as fault or configuration. Therefore, the TMN builds 
a stack of functions that can often be over-kill for a service provider. Furthermore, most 
Operational Support Systems (OSS's) do not cleanly map to the TMN model, making 
the model even more of a burden on the development and deployment process. In 
addition further limitations ofTMN are; 
• Lacks the flexibility required for approaching iterative services.
• Not regarded the legacy which has provided the foundation for many Service
Providers (Gillen, n.d.).
OMN/Point theory 
Open Management Interoperability Point (OMNIPoint) can be defmed as " . . .  a set of 
standards, implementation specifications, testing methods and tools, and object libraries 
that make possible the development of interoperable management systems and 
applications" (Hemmen, 2000, p. 303). It provides terms for the basic infrastructure to 
implement open management of networks. Further more OMNIPoint architecture is 
built by defining actions and their common relationships, which are essential for NM. 
However, OMNIPoint theory does not define the actual management applications 
themselves. Even though OMNIPoint defines the elements that must be implemented to 
achieve the effective exchange of management information, the detailed functions to be 
performed by particular management applications are not defined by OMNIPoint 
(Hemmen, 2000). 
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IT Infrastructure Library 
According to Dubie (2002, para. 2), "The Information Technology Infrastructure 
Library (ITIL) is a set of rules for how to deliver information technology (IT) services 
more efficiently by improving management processes across IT departments that 
support networks, applications, databases and systems". ITIL describes IT infrastructure 
as the total technological components, the system and application software, the 
documentation and all the procedures that are essential to realise one or more IT 
services. Each of the processes and objects is described in a module and in each module 
a reference is made to other modules that are related to the process or object described 
by that module. The ITIL module 'Network Services Management' describes processes 
and their common relationships. Generally these processes and their common 
relationships are related to the infrastructure (IT). Hence, these processes can be used to 
define a design for NM (Hemmen, 2000). 
However, limitations of ITIL are described as follows: 
• Lack of management commitment; ITIL takes time and a lot of process change.
• Complexity; IT staff will get overwhelmed if break each ITIL process into large
steps.
• Poor work instructions; ITIL gives guidance, but it doesn't tell how to actually
do anything.
• Misdirected metrics; Need to measure quality, not just performance.
• Diminished momentum; Need to develop achievable goals that keep this in mind
(Worthen, 2005).
Tasks-Frame of reference (T-FORce) 
According to Hemmen (2000), T-FORce is defined as offering methods, models and 
techniques for managing information systems. This requires managing, controlling and 
maintaining implemented information systems. The following concepts are considered 
in the T-FORce model: 
• Tasks, task areas, task fields.
• Levels of management.
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• Forms of management.
• The logo ofMintzberg.
Tasks can recognise processes and these tasks can be grouped to form a process. From 
a NM perspective the weakness of T-Force is that its primary focus is upon information 
systems rather than networks. Networks are defined as a part of an information system; 
therefore T-FORce model is only fairly applicable to NM. Hence, not all tasks that are 
considered in T-FORce model apply to NM (Hemmen, 2000). 
DUneT Management Model 
The purpose of the DUneT Management Model is to order the different network 
services and to describe service interfaces. This model describes the functions that are 
essential for data communications. The DUneT Management Model is a layered model. 
In order to assist the understanding of a service that is essential to carry out the service 
in the layer above, each lower layer offers a service. Furthermore, in all layers a service 
provider can offer its own network services (Hemmen, 2000). 
However, according to Terplan (1988), DUneT model does not describe NM 
architecture, NM functions, NM instrumentation, Organisational components or 
Organisational approach. 
In conclusion, Hemmen (2000) states that for the above described models: 
None of the models are adequate to model evolving heterogeneous networks, 
due to the following definitions: 
• None of the models presently available deal with the evolution of
networks, but they cover heterogeneity. All vendors and users are aware
of the necessity for open systems in which hardware and software can be
connected and can interact. Evolution of the network and network
services has received less attention. It is initiated by such driving forces
as economics, Organizational and technical forces.
• The models described use a top-down approach only instead of a mixture
of a top-down and a bottom-up approach. With the top-down approach is
meant that architecture for NM is recognized, without considering the
actual realization in detail of that architecture in practice. NM is
described at an abstract level, where details are not recognized.
• The models are impracticable for managers at a strategic and tactical
level. Those described were selected for their focus on the Organization
of NM, Many other models exist which focus only on technical aspects
of NM. The technical focus of those models implies the influence of the
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operational level due to the professional knowledge that is required to 
perform NM. Due to a lack and deficiencies of present instruments in 
providing information for senior management, management is not able to 
control NM effectively. (p. 313) 
The available models focus mainly on the technical aspects of NM that are part of the 
operational NM. Due to the. huge investments and the strategic importance of the 
network and its services, decisions concerning the network and its services must be 
made by senior management. However, none of the above models, methods or 
techniques are available to assist managers with these decisions. Thereby it is necessary 
to invent models and provide methods to further develop effective NM (Hemmen, 
2000). 
Protocols for Network Management 
The protocols used by the NM tools play a significant role in the management arena. 
The first detailed NM tool was the Simple Gateway Monitoring Protocol (SGMP), 
introduced in 1987. While SGMP can monitor gateways, still was not a general purpose 
tool. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) came along a year later, but only 
for Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) networks. In 1993, SNMP 
was extended to use AppleTalk and Novell lnc.'s Internetwork Packet Exchange (IPX) 
protocols. However, SNMP is extremely difficult to implement and not very efficient. 
Even though SNMP is widely available and interoperable amongst a variety of network 
components, it wastes considerable bandwidth relaying unnecessary information (Kay, 
2002). 
In addition, the following are further limitations of SNMP. 
• May not be suitable for management of truly large networks because of
polling performance limitations.
• Not well suited for retrieving large amounts of data ( entire routing table).
• Traps are unacknowledged (could be lost based on UDP/IP).
• Only trivial authentication in base protocol--better for monitoring than
control.
• Only way to trigger an event is to set a variable (rather than having a
remote procedure call like interface)
• Does not support manager-to-manager communications (Worcester
Polytechnic Institute, 2004, para. 40).
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While the OSI NM model addresses some of the above issues, but it is widely believed 
that size of the specification is too complicated and its full functionality has taken long 
time to implement (Worcester Polyteclmic Institute, 2004). 
Remote Network Monitoring (RMON) is another protocol that was used for NM. 
RMON is designed to collect information about the network itself. A single 
· management station can monitor multiple segments through distributed monitoring.
Then in the mid-1990s, the more powerful and secure Common Management
Information Protocol (CMIP) was developed to replace SNMP (Kay, 2002). However,
"The fact that CMIP uses 10 times the network overhead has meant that SNMP is still
the major player in the industry" (Kay, 2002, p. 48).
Network Security Management
The best way to balance network secrµity threats is to predict things before they occur
and to expect the unexpected (Kammerer, 2005). Hence, according to Lynas ( cited in
Lawson, 2005, p. 45) "Spend absolutely every penny you need to on security but not a
penny more". In order to manage the various firewalls, Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) and other security devices, it is better to have security specialists because security
occurs at a very specific location on the network and has a very specific function.
Furthermore, the boundary of security is absorbent, and therefore, security needs to be
applied at the application level, at the network level and at the storage level (Cummings,
2005).
According to Levine (2005), most compames are increasingly adopting wireless
communications for their employees. Wireless options often may permit an avoidance
of security policies, intentionally or unintentionalJy since most employees remain
uneducated or undereducated about the possibilities of security violations. Therefore,
according to Markovich (cited in Levine, 2005, p. 54) "Malware and hackers target
WLANs (wireless local area networks) because they are the new low-hanging fruit of
the IT world. It's relatively easy to exploit an open AP or divert a laptop to a hacker's
wireless device".
While there are many types of wireless threats, some are exacerbated by improper
employee use. Sometimes internal violations occur because employees knowingly
compromise the network, they are careless or they simply do not understand how to
keep transmissions seoµre. Increase employee awareness training and emphasize written
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security policies are basic solutions to prevent security breaches in wireless networks 
(Levine, 2005). 
In the professional IT environment not all threats are technical in nature. Physical 
security is as important as technological security. There are two general classifications 
of physical threats, malicious and non-malicious. Malicious threats include attempts to 
break into the network and non-malicious threats arise when a good person makes a 
mistake. However, both threats can be tackled with effective physical security (Gilmer, 
2005). 
There are several threats that may cause problems when connecting to the Internet. 
Some of these are port probes, viruses and worms, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, 
Ping of Death (PoD) attacks, and Universal Datagram Protocol (UDP) flood attacks. 
Proper management knowledge is a key factor in fighting off these attacks, while well 
managed firewalls and routers can protect core networks (Gilmer, 2005). 
Commercial systems which commonly use remote access are open to major security 
risks. Remote access puts responsive data on the outside of the company firewall 
usually on various movable devices that are difficult to control. In order to ensure a high 
security environment, companies need to have resources and processes, consistently and 
thoroughly in place, as well as much better security management methods (Stoller, 
2005). 
State Model Diagrams 
According to Maj and Kohli (2004, p. 136-214) "Models are a means of controlling 
detail and complexity. Desirable model characteristics include; diagrammatic, self 
documenting, easy to use and hierarchical top down decomposition to control detail". A 
good model, levels the processes by which complex systems can be progressively 
decomposed, whilst still maintaining essential links. Maj and Kohli (2004) proposed 
that intemetworking devices (switches, routers etc) could be diagrammatically 
represented using a collection of tables called state model diagrams. These diagrams 
have been successfully used for teaching intemetworking technology curriculum. 
As a pedagogical tool the state diagrams explicitly incorporate the TCP/IP and OSI 
stacks (Figure 3), however for experienced administrators they may be removed. 
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E0/1 I I 
Network Acee! sLayer2: 
Oatallnk Interface Line Protocol (triggered by keep alive frames} MAC address 
E0/1 Up 
Network Acee! $Layer 1: 
Physical Interface Line status (triggered by Carrier detect ,lgnal 
E0/1 Up 
Figure 3: Router State Model. (Maj, Kohli and Fetherston, 2005, p. 2) 
The modular nature of the diagrams provides a top down decomposition by means of 
levelling. According to Maj, Kohli and Fetherston (2005): 
One of the most important features of these diagrams is the ability to construct a 
variety of different levels according to the level of abstraction required. This 
means that the initial (level 0) diagram can be consulted to obtain a high level 
overview of device interconnectivity i.e. what switches and routers are 
connected together. When details of a specific device are needed, then greater 
technical complexity for that specific device can be obtained. Obviously, the 
different levels of diagram are consistent. The diagrams may be decomposed to 
the level that is meaningful for the purpose that the diagram is required. 
This may be illustrated by a router OSI layer 1 line status (carrier detect table). For the 
purposes of NM, it is not appropriate to decompose this further - the interface is either 
up or down. Furthermore, a simple routing protocol e.g. RIP may be represented by a 
level 3 routing table (Figure 3). Significantly, this same basic state model used for a 
router running RIP may be also be used for other more complex routing protocol such 
as Enhanced Interior I.louting Protocol (EIGRP). 
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According to Maj, Kohli and Fetherston (2005): 
It is possible, using the switch state model, to implement protocols that include: 
basic switch operation ( address learning, forwarding/filtering), Spanning Tree, 
Virtual LAN's (VLANs), trunking, VLAN Trunking Protocol (VTP) and Ether­
channelling. 
1m'IP 
� 
� -
� 
'l'llilllpllt 
� 
7 lib 
==�-�======����- ==- -=- =I 
Figure 4: Switch State Model. (Maj, Kohli and Fetherston, 2005, p. 2) 
Significantly, hyperlinks may be used to navigate between not only different devices but 
also different tables in the same device. 
According to Maj, Ratnayake & Tran (2005) state model diagrams of a wireless Access 
Point and a PIX firewall were developed. The wireless Access Point (AP) state model 
(Figure 5) consists of an association table, radio interface table and cable interface 
(Ethernet) table. The association table provides IP to MAC address associations. The 
radio interface table allows identification of the radio interface (e.g. 802. lla, 5GHz), 
the SSID and authentication parameters. 
Stateful packet filters combine the best of packet filtering and proxy filtering 
technologies. Stateful packet filters maintain complete session state information for 
each session. Each time an IP connection is established (inbound or outbound), the 
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information is logged in a stateful session flow table. For this research study, a Private 
Internet exchange (PIX) stateful packet filter (firewall) was used. PIX firewalls 
employed dedicated hardware ( ensuring high performance) and use the Adaptive 
Security Algorithm (ASA) for stateful connection control. The ASA uses the concept of 
security levels - security level 100 being the highest and is assigned to an inside 
interface. Security level O is the lowest and is assigned to an outside interface. PIX 
devices may have more than two interfaces, in which case these may be assigned 
different levels of security. 
AP1200-1 
MAC IP Device Narre Parent State 
Interface dot11radio1 
SSID Group2 
Authentication Open 
Channel Frequency 40 (5200M-lz) 
Interface BhemelO 
IP 
MAC 
Figure 5: Wireless Access Point State Model. 
(Maj, S. P., Ratnayake, S. A., & Tran, B., 2005, p. 3) 
High (inside) to low (outside) security may be enabled by two different methods - static 
or dynamic translation. Dynamic translation employs a global address pool and Network 
Address Translation (NAT). The PIX firewall state model diagram (Figure 6) shows a 
static translation. However, it is possible to also model dynamic translation. This PIX 
state model diagram incorporates the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), route and 
interface tables. It also includes the Xlate table that provides the local to global IP 
address translation and the "conn" table identifies the two end devices being connected. 
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PIX1 
Xlate 
ARP 
gloabl local 
Interface Inside Dmz Outside 
192.168.1.99 192.168.100.2 
IP 192.168.100.2 192.168.1.2 
MAC 00-02-55-73-0a-d? 00-02-55-73-0d-95 
Interface e1 
Static Conn nameif inside 
Inside 192.168.100.2 I in 192.168.100.2 Security 100 
Outside 192.168.1.99 I Out 192.168.1.2 IP 192.168.100.1/24 
I I I 
MAC 0012.8081.e29d 
Interface e2 
nameif dmz 
Security 50 
Route IP 192.168.50.1/24 
Interface inside Dmz outside MAC 000e.Oc65.a96e 
Ip 192.168.100.0 192.168.50.0 192.168.1.0 
Interface eO 
Snm 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 
nameif outside 
Ip 192.168.100.1 192.168.50.1 192.168.1.1 
Security 0 
Metric 1 1 1 IP 192.168.1.1/24 
Connect Connect Connect MAC 0012.8081.e29c 
type static static static 
Figure 6: PIX Firewall State Model. 
(Maj, S. P., Ratnayake, S. A., & Tran, B., 2005, p. 4) 
17 
3.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Identification of Variables Impacting on the Hypothesis 
In order to avoid errors, repetitive measurements have been taken and the results were 
based on practical experiments. The experiments data that collected relied upon the 
responses of the software and hardware in the network and research data that collected 
relied upon the responses from research participants. 
3.2 Targeted Population 
• Network managers and administrators searching for ways to minimize costs and
complexity when managing the network.
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4.0 MATERIALS AND METHODS OF INVESTIGATION 
4.1 Description of Materials to be employed 
The following equipment was used for the research investigation: 
• Ciscoworks 2000 NM application
• Computers: Intel Pentium N machines with 512 MB of RAM
• Operating systems: Windows XP, Windows 2003 advanced server and
Red hat Linux 9.0 operating systems
• Routers: Cisco 2600 series routers, running IOS version 12.2
• Switches (Layer 2): Catalyst 2950 wire-speed 24 ports Fast Ethernet
switches, running IOS version 21.1
• Switches (Layer 3): Catalyst 3550 multi-layer switches with 24-port
10/100 switch and GBIC-based Gigabit Ethernet ports will be use to
experiment with multicasting, running IOS version 21.1
• Wireless Access Point: Aironet 1200 Access Point, operate in 802.lla
band through 5 GHz transmission, running- running IOS version 12.2.
• Pix firewall: Pix 5 l 5e with 3 interfaces supporting VPN and 3DES
encryption.
• Wireless Client Adapter: Aironet 802.1 la/b/g wireless PCI adapter.
• Intel Pro 10/100 Mbps network interface cards.
The School of Computer and Information Science at Edith Cowan University had all the 
equipment to perform the investigation. The network equipment in the labs was up-to­
date and standardised for both education and commercial environments. Therefore this 
investigation provided valuable information about the network environment. 
4.2 Design and Procedure of the Study 
This investigation involved examining the results provided by the NM application. A 
direct measurement n;iethod was used for this investigation because it was application 
specific (Ori, 2002). 
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Stallings (1993) stated that NM can be measured in 2 steps: 
Step 1: Network monitoring - a read function, concerned with observing and 
analyzing status and behaviors of the configurations and its components. 
Step 2: Network control - a write function, concerned with altering parameters 
of various components in the network. 
In order to achieve accurate measurements, multiple network configurations 
implemented for the evaluation. The experiments were conducted only in a Local Area 
Network (LAN) environment. The initial investigation involved examining simple 
network configurations which was used afterwards as a baseline. Afterwards, the 
baseline used to assess more complex network configurations. The experimental 
configurations are as follows: 
LAN Configurations 
(Refer to Appendix C for the configuration commands) 
& eO �-
PC2 
PG 1 
PIX1 Ciscoworks Server 
Figure 7: Experiment 1, baseline experiment with single Internetworking device 
(firewall). 
Ciscoworks Server 
Figure 8: Experiment 2 with multiple Internetworking devices (router, firewall) 
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Router1 Ciscoworks Server 
Switch1 PIX1 
11----"e=O --�
PC2 
Figure 9: Experiment 3 with multiple Intemetworking devices (router, firewall and 
switch) 
Ciscnworks Server 
AP1 Switch1 Router1 PIX1 PC2 
Figure 10: Experiment 4 with multiple Intemetworking devices (router, firewall, 
switch, access point) 
Router1 
Router2 
PIX1 
eO e1 
/ AP1 
FaO/V 
-�Fa0/3 
PC2 
Fa0/2 
Switch1 
P1x2 switch2 Ciscoworks Server 
Fa0/1 
PC 1 
1-=--
Jj:, 
PC4 
AP2 
. Figure 11: Experiment 5 with multiple Intemetworking devices in the LAN. 
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In order to achieve maximum accuracy and reliability, the evaluation compared and 
contrasted based on the three parameters as in Figure 12. 
Figure 12: Network management evaluation procedures 
1. State Model: Managing the network using the SM
2. Automate: Use Cisco Works to evaluate NM.
3. Manual: Use Command Line Interface (CLI).
Router 
1· 
IP .address 
Port 
Fa0/1 
I Port 
Fa0/1 
I IP address 
I 
I MAC address 
I 
1- 1
MAC address 
I I Port 
I I Fa0/0 
II Port 
I·" 
Interface 
I IP address 
I 
I MAC address 
II Fa0/0 I 
State Model 
I 
PC 1 
PC2 P1x1 Ciscoworks Server 
Automate 
Figure 13: Evaluating the effectiveness of NM using the SM and Ciscoworks 
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ARP Xlate 
Interface Inside Dmz Outside global local 
IP 192.168.1.1 192.168.2.1 192.168.3.1 192.168.2.99 192.168.1.1 
MAC 0002.557a.6fd3 0002.5573.b23a 0002.5573.0824 192.168.3.99 192.168.1.1 CiscoWorks Server 
192.168.3.98 192.168.2.1 Interface Cable NIC 
IP 192.168.1.1 
Static Interface e1 Gateway 192.168.1.2 
Inside 192.168.1.1 
nameif inside 0002.557a.6fd3 MAC 
192.168.3.99 Conn Outside Security 100 
in 192.168.2.1 IP 192.168.1.2 Inside 192.168.1.1 PC1 Out 192.168.3.1 MAC 0012.d96f.db39 DMZ 192.168.2.99 
Interface Cable NIC 
Interface e2 
IP 192.168.2.1 Dmz 192.168.2. 1 
nameif dmz 
192.168.2.2 Gateway outside 192.168.3.98 Security 50 
MAC 0002.5573.b23a 
IP 192.168.2.2 
MAC 000e.Oc66.6bed PC2 
Route Interface eO Interface Cable NIC 
Interface inside Dmz outside 
nameif outside IP 192.168.3.1 
Ip 192.168.1.0 192.168.2.0 192.168.3.0 Security 0 Gateway 192.168.3.2 
Snm 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 IP 192.168.3.2 MAC 0002.5573.0824 
Ip 192.168.1.1 192.168.2.1 192.168.3.1 
MAC 0012.d96f.db38 
Metric 1 1 1 
Connect Connect Connect 
type static static static 
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ARP Xlate 
Interface Inside Dmz Outside global local 
IP 192.168.2.1 192.168.1.1 192.168.3.1 192.168.3.99 192.168.2.1 
MAC 0002.5573:0649 0002.557 a.1 c39 0012.01ae. 7 461 192.168.3.98 192.168.1.1 
192.168.1.99 192.168.2.1 
Route 
lnterfac inside Dmz outside outside PC1 
e Interface Cable NIC 
Ip 192.168.2.0 192.168.1.0 192.168.3.0 0.0.0.0 Interface e1 >- IP 192.168.2.1 
Snm :· 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 nameif inside Gateway 192.168.2.2 
Ip 192.168.2.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.3.1 Security 100 MAC 0002.5573.0649 
Metric 1 1 1 1 IP 192.168.2.2 
Connect Connect Connect Other MAC 0012.d96f.db5a 
type static static static static CiscoWorks Server 
Interface e2 
- Interface Cable NIC 
~!AT nameif dmz 
IP 192.168.1.1 
nameif Inside Dmz Static Security 50 Gateway 192.168.1.2 
nat-id 1 IP 192.168.1.2 
MAC 0002.557 a.1 c39 Inside 192.168.2.1 
real-ip 192.168.2.0 A-group ACLIN2 
Outside 192.168.3.99 dmz 192.168.1.1 
SNM 255.255.255.0 In/out in Outside 192.168.3.98 Inside 192.168.2.1 
Max conn 0 MAC 000e.Oc66.6c79 dmz 192.168.1.99 
I Emb-limit 0 Router Fa0/1 ACL Interface eO 
Global 
nameif outside Fa0/0 Name ACLIN ACLIN2 
nameif outside Dmz Permit/Deny Permit Permit Security 0 PC2 
nat-id 1 1 Protocol Tep Tep IP 192.168.3.2 Interface Cable NIC 
Global-ip 192.168.3.10 192.168.1.10 Source Any Any A-group ACLIN IP 192.168.4.1 
Global-ip 192.168.3.20 192.168.1.20 Destination 192.168.3.99 Any In/out in Gateway 192.168.4.2 
SNM 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 Parameters Eqwww Eqwww MAC 0012.d96f.db58 MAC 0002.5573.0867 
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Router 
C IP AIM IP Port 
C 192.168.3.0 Fa0/1 
C 192.168.4.0 Fa0/0 
IP address MAC address Interface I192.168.3.99 0012.d96f.db58 Fa0/1 
192.168.3.98 0012.d96f.db58 Fa0/1 
192.168.3.2 0012.d96f.db58 Fa0/1 
192.168.3.1 0012.01ae.7461 Fa0/1 
192.168.4.1 0002.5573.0867 Fa0/0 
192.168.4.2 0012.01ae.7460 Fa0/0 
Port IP address Port IP address 
Fa0/1 192.168.3.1 Fa0/0 192.168.4.2 
PIX Firewall 
Port MAC address Port MAC address 
Fa0/1 0012.01ae.7461 Fa0/0 0012.01ae.7460 
eO 
192.168.4.0 
192.168.3.0 I 
Device PC2 
IP 192.168.4.1 /24 
Gateway 192.168.4.2 
MAC 0002.5573.1167 
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ARP Global CiscoWorks Server 
Interface· Inside Dmz Outside nameif outside Dmz Interface Cable NIC 
IP 192.168.2.1 192.168.1.1 192.168.3.1 nat-id 1 1 IP 192.168.4.1 
MAC 000c.30e2.c760 0002.557 a.8125 0002.5573.0b48 Global-ip 192.168.3.10 192.168.1.10 Gateway 192.168;4.2 
Global-ip 192.168.3.20 192.168.1.20 MAC 0002.5573.0840 
"'IT 
nameif Inside 
Xlate 
Dmz SNM 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 
nat-id 1 global local Fa0/1 
reaJ;ip - 192.168.4.0 192.168.3.99 192.168.4.1 Interface e1 I I Switch SNM 255.255.255.0 192.168.3.98 192.168.1.1 nameif inside 
Max conri 0 
192.168.1.99 192.168.4.1 Security 100 Fa0/2 
Emb-limit 0 IP 192.168.2.2 Fa0/1 
I MAC 0012.d96f.db4d I Router Fa0/0 Route 
Interface inside Dmz outside inside Interface e2 
nameif dmz PC1 
Ip 192.168.2.0 192.168.1.0 192.168.3.0 0.0.0.0 Security 50 Interface Cable NIC 
Snm 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 IP 192.168.1.2 IP 192.168.1.1 
Ip 192.168.2.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.2.1 A-group ACLIN2 Gateway 192.168.1.2 
Metric 1 1 1 1 
MAC 0002.557a.8125 
In/out in 
Connect Connect Connect Other MAC 000e.Oc66.6c3b 
type static static static static 
Static ACL Interface eO 
Inside 192.168.4.1 Name ACLIN ACLIN2 nameif outside PC2 
Outside 192.168.3.99 Permit/Deny Permit Permit Security 0 Interface Cable NIC 
Protocol Tep Tep IP 192.168.3.2 IP 192.168.3.1 
Inside 192.168.4.1 Source Any Any A-group ACLIN Gateway 192.168.3.2 
dmz 1921168.1.99 Destination 192.168.3.991 Any In/out in MAC 0002.5573.0b48 
dmz 192.168.1.1 92.168.3.98 
Outside Parameters Eqwww Eqwww 
MAC 0012.d96f.db4c 
192.168.3.98 
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Router 
Switch 
C IP AIM IP Port 
MAC Address Table C 192.168.4.0 Fa0/1 
VLAN MAC address Type Interface s 192.168.1.0 1/0 192.168.2.2 
1 0002.5573.0840 DYNAMIC Fa0/1 C 192.168.2.0 Fa0/0 
1 000c.30e2.c761 DYNAMIC Fa0/2 
s 192.168.3.0 1/0 192.168.2.2 
IP address MAC address Interface 
192.168.2.2 0012.d96f.db4d Fa0/0 
192.168.2.1 000c.30e2.c760 Fa0/0 
Interface LP Interface LP 192.168.4.1 0002.5573.0840 Fa0/1 
Fa0/1 Up Fa0/2 Up 
192.168.4.2 000c.30e2.c761 Fa0/1 
Interface LS Interface LS 
Fa0/1 Up Fa0/2 Up 
Port IP address Port IP address 
Fa0/1 192.168.4.2. Fa0/0 192.168.2.1 
Device CiscoWorks Server 
Port MAC address Port MAC address 
IP 192.168.4.1 
Fa0/1 000c.30e2.c761 Fa0/0 000c.30e2.c760 
MAC 0002.5573.0840 
e1 
""'"ti;IIIIIIII ll!:i:111}\Jflf·1'~"i'lllln" ... 
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CiscoWorks Server 
Layer 3: 
Network Interface IP address SNM 
NIC 192.168.4.1 255.255.255.0 
Layer 2: 
Datalink 
Interface Wireless NIC 
SSID ML 13.134-AP4 
Device PC2 
IP 192.168.3.1 
MAC 0002.5573.1167 
Network Infrastructure 
AP authentication Open 
MAC 0040.96a6.7d64 
Layer 1: 
Physical 
NIC 802.11a 
eO 
Power level 20mW Device PC1 e2 
40 (5200MHz IP -192.168.1.1 
I e I Auto I I MAC I I 
I Power save mode I Constantlv Awake Mode (CAM) l e1 PIX Fire 
Data rat  0002.5573.b7f2 
wall 
AP1200-1 
MAC IP Device Name Parent State 
000b.5f55.3972 192.168.4.10 AP AP4 
Fa0/0 
Interface dot11 radio1 Interface Ethernet O 
SSID ML 13.134-AP4 IP Fa0/1 Switch Fa0/2 Router 
Authentication Open MAC Fa0/1 
Channel Frequency 40 (5200MHz) 8-G 
MAC address OOOb.46ca.61c5 
Bridae-arouo 1 
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CiscoWorks Server 
ARP Global Interface Wireless NIC 
Interface Inside Dmz Outside nameif outside Dmz IP 192.168.4.1 
IP 192.168.2.1 192.168.1.1 192.168.3.1 nat-id 1 1 Gatewav 192.168.4.2 
MAC 000c.309e:6480 0002.5573.b7f2 0002.5573.1167 Global-ip 192.168.3.10 192.168.1.10 MAC 0040.96a6.7d64 
Global-ip 192.168.3 .. 20 192.168.1.20 
.. AT 
l I ln<:irl<> Xlate SNM 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 Access Point n~m<>if Dmz 
nat-id. 1 qlobal local I Fa0/1 real-ia 192.168.4.0 192.168.3.99 192.168.4.1 Interface e1 
SNM 255.255.255.0 192.168.3.98 192.168.1.1 nameif inside Switch 
192.168.1.99 192.168.4.1 Security 100 Max conn 0 
Fa0/21 
IP 192.168.2.2 Fa0/1 Emb-limit 0 
MAC 0012.d96f.db47 I Fa0/0 Router Route 
Interface inside Dmz outside inside Interface e2 
nameif dmz PC1 
lo 192.168.2.0 192.168.1.0 192.168.3.0 0.0.0.0 Securitv 50 Interface Cable NIC 
Snm 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 IP 192.168.1.2 
IP 192.168.1.1 
Ip 192.168.2.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.2.1 A-group ACLIN2 
Gatewav 192.168.1.2 
Metric 1 1 1 1 In/out in MAC 0002.5573.b7f2 
Connect Connect Connect Other MAC 000e.Oc66.6bdb 
type static static static static 
.,._.,_ ACL Interface eO 
Inside 192.168.4.1 Name ACLIN ACLIN2 nameif outside PC2 
Outside 192.168.3.99 Permit/Denv Permit Permit Securitv 0 Interface Cable NIC 
Protocol Tep Tep IP 192.168.3.2 IP 192.168.3.1 
Inside 192.168.4.1 Source Anv Anv A-arouo ACLIN Gatewav 192.168.3.2 
dmz 192.168.1.99 Destination 192.168.3.991 Any In/out in MAC nnn2.5573.1167 
dmz 192.168.1.1 Q? .168,3,98 
Parameters Eqwww Eqwww MAC 0012.d96f.db46 Outside 192.168.3.98 
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Router 
Switch 
C IP AIM IP Port 
MAC Address Table C 192. 168.4.0 Fa0/1 
VLAN MAC address Type Interface s 192. 168. 1.0 1/0 192.168.2.2 
1 0040.96a6.7d64 DYNAMIC Fa0/1 C 192.168.2.0 Fa0/0 
1 000c.309e.6481 DYNAMIC Fa0/2 
s 192.168.3.0 1/0 192.168.2.2 
IP address MAC address Interface 
192.168.2.2 0012.d96f.db47 Fa0/0 
192.168.2.1 000c.309e.6480 Fa0/0 
Interface LP Interface LP 192.168.4.1 0040.96a6.7d64 Fa0/1 
Fa0/1 Up Fa0/2 Up 
192.168.4.2 000c.309e.6481 Fa0/1 
Interface LS Interface LS 
Fa0/1 Up Fa0/2 Up 
Port IP address Port IP address 
Access Point 
Fa0/1 192.168.4.2 Fa0/0 192. 168.2.1 
Port MAC address Port MAC address 
Fa0/1 000c.309e.6481 Fa0/0 000c.309e.6480 
e1 
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PC 1 
Layer 3: 
Network Interface IP address SNM 
NIC 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 
Layer 2: Interface Wireless NIC 
Datalink SSID ML 13.134-AP5 
Network Infrastructure 
AP authentication Open 
MAC 0002.5573.b7f2 
Layer 1: NIC 802.11a 
Physical Power level 20mW 
ChannelFreauencv 40 {5200MHz) 
Data rate Auto PC2 
Power save mode Constantly Awake Mode {CAM) Interface I Cable NIC 
IP I 192.168.1.2 
Gateway I 192.168.1.3 
MAC I 0002.5573.1167 
~ I ~ I I I 
MAC IP Device Name Parent State 
0013.1 a32.97 eb 192.168.1.10 AP AP5 
Fa0/3 
Interface dot11 radio1 Interface Ethernet 0 
SSID ML 13.134-AP5 IP Fa0/1 Switch 1· 
Authentication Ooen MAC 
ChannelFreauencv 40 {5200MHz) 8-G 
MAC address 0011.20ee.d2bd 
1 
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Router 1 
Switch 1 C IP AIM IP Port 
192.168.2.0 Fa0/1 C MAC Address Table 
"I 
Fa0/0 C 92.168.3.0 
VLAN MAC address Type Interface R 1 120/1 192.168.3.2 Fa0/0 
<12.1RR.4.n 
1 0013.1a32.97eb DYNAMIC Fa0/1 
1 0012.d96f.db47 DYNAMIC Fa0/2 
1 0002.5573.b7f2 DYNAMIC Fa0/1 IP address MAC address Interface 
192.168.2.99 0012.d96f.db46 Fa0/1 
1 0002.5573.1167 DYNAMIC Fa0/3 
192.168.2.98 0012.d96f.db46 Fa0/1 
192.168.2.1 0012.d96f.db46 Fa0/1 
Interface LP Interface LP Interface LP 192.168.2.2 000c.309e.6481 Fa0/1 
Fa0/1 Uo Fa0/3 Uo Fa0/2 Up 192.1_68.3.1 000c.309e.6480 Fa0/0 
192.168.3.2 000c.30e2.c620 Fa0/0 
Interface LS Interface LS Interface LS 
Fa0/1 Up Fa0/3 Up Fa0/2 Up 
Port IP address Port IP address 
Fa0/1 192.168.2.2 Fa0/0 192.168.3.1 
Access Point 1 Interface Cable NIC 
IP 192.168.1.2 Port MAC address Port MAC address 
Gateway 192.168.1.3 e1 Fa0/1 000c.309e.6481 Fa0/0 000c.309e.6480 
PC1 
MAC 0002.5573.1167 
'~ 
Interface Wireless NIC 
PC2 Fa0/0 IP 192.168.1.1 
" 
Gateway 192.168.1.3 0 I I PIX F1rewall 1 Router 2 
MAC 0002.5573.b7f2 
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PC1 
Xlate 
PIX Firewall 1 Interface Wireless NIC 
global local IP 192.168.1.1 
ARP 192.168.2.99 192.168.1.1 Gateway 192.168.1.3 
Interface Inside inside Outside 192.168.2.98 192.168.1.2 MAC 0002 .5573 .b 7f2 
IP 192.168.1.1 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 
. 
MAC 0002.5573.b7f2 0002.5573.1167 000c.309e.6481 
Access Point 1 
·Route 
Fa0/1 
Interface inside outside outside 
Ip 192.168.1.0 192.168.2.0 0.0.0.0 Interface e1 
Fa0/2 Switch 1 
Snm 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 0.0.0.0 nameif inside Fa0/3 
Ip 192.168.1.3 192.168.2.1 192.168.2.2 
Security 100 PC2 
IP 192.168.1.3 Interface Cable NIC 
Metric 1 1 1 MAC 0012.d96f.db47 IP 192.168.1.2 
Connect Connect Other Gateway 192.168.1.3 
type static static static MAC 0002.5573.1167 
AC[ 
Name ACLIN ACLIN Interface eO Static 
-.. -... -
Router 1 
Inside 192.168.1.1 Permit/Deny Permit Permit nameif outside Fa0/1 
Outside 192.168.2.99 Protocol Tep ICMP Security 0 Fa0/0 
Inside 192.168.1.2 Source Any Any IP 192.168.2.1 Fa0/0 
Destination 192.168.2.991 192.168.2.99 
92.168.2.98 192.168.2.98 
A-group ACLIN 
In/out in 
outside 192.168.2.98 Router 2 
Parameters Eqwww Echo-reply 
MAC 0012.d96f.db46 
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PIX Firewall 2 
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Network Interface IP address SNM 
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MAC IP Device Name Parent State 
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Fa0/3 
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' Fa0/1 Switch 2 SSID ML 13.134-AP4 IP 
Authentication Ooen MAC 
Channel Frequency 40 (5200MHz) 8-G 
MAC address 000b.46ca.61 c5 
Bridqe-qrouo / 1 
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Router 2 
Switch 2 
C IP AIM IP Port 
MAC Address Table C 192.168.3.0 Fa0/0 
C 192.168.4.0 Fa0/1 
VLAN MAC address Type Interface 
R 192.168.2.0 120/1 192.168.3.1 Fa0/0 
1 000b.5f55.3972 DYNAMIC Fa0/1 
1 0002.5573.b23a DYNAMIC Fa0/1 
1.· 0012.d96f.db39 DYNAMIC Fa0/2 
IP address MAC address Interface 
192.168.3.1 000c.309e.6480 Fa0/0 
1 0002.5573.2024 DYNAMIC Fa0/3 
192.168.3.2 000c.30e2.c620 Fa0/0 
192.168.4.1 0012.d96f.db38 Fa0/1 
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Fa0/1 Up Fa0/3 Up Fa0/2 Up 192.168.4.99 0012.d96f.db38 Fa0/1 
192.168.4.98 0012.d96f.db38 Fa0/1 
Interface LS Interface LS Interface LS 
Fa0/1 Up Fa0/3 Up Fa0/2 Up 
Port IP addre$S Port IP address 
Fa0/1 192.168.4.2 Fa0/0 192.168.3.2 
Access Point 2 
Interface Cable NIC 
IP 192.168.5.1 Port 
I 
MAC address Port MAC address 
PC4 Gateway 192.168.5.3 e1 Fa0/1 000c.30e2.c621 Fa0/0 000c.30e2.c620 
Interface Wireless NIC MAC 0002.5573.2024 
IP 192.168.5.2 CiscoWorks Server Fa0/0 Gateway 192.168.5.3 
eO 
MAC 0002.5573.b23a PIX Firewall 2 Router 1 
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Xlate 
PIX Firewall 2 
global local 
PIX Firewall 1 eO 
ARP 192.168.4.99 192.168.5.1 
· Interface Inside inside Outside 192.168.4.98 192.168.5.2 Fa0/1 
IP 192.168.5.1 192.168.5.2 192.168.4.2 Router 1 
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Snm 255.255.255.0 255.255.255.0 0.0.0.0 
Ip 192.168.5.3 192.168.4.1 192.168.4.2 
IP 192.168.4.1 
A-group ACLIN 
CiscoWorks Server 
Interface Cable NIC 
Metric 1 1 1 In/out in IP 192.168.5.1 
Connect Connect Other MAC 0012.d96f.db38 Gateway 192.168.5.3 
type static static static MAC 0002.5573.2024 
Fa0/3 
ACL 
Name ACLIN ACLIN Interface e1 Static 
-- -·-
Fa0/2 Switch 2 
Inside 192.168.5.1 Permit/Deny Permit Permit nameif inside Fa0/1 
Outside 192.168.4.99 Protocol Tep ICMP Security 100 
Source Any Any 
/ 
Destination 192.168.4.991 192.168.4.99 
92.168.4.98 192.168.4.98 
Inside 192.168.5.2 
outside 192.168.4.98 
IP 192.168.5.3 
MAC 0012.d96f.db39 
Access Point 2 
PC4 
Parameters Eqwww Echo-reply Interface Wireless NIC 
IP 192.168.5.2 
Gateway 192.168.5.3 
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4.3 Data Collection 
After above experiments were implemented, a questionnaire (refer to Appendix A) was 
given to selected network experts and network students to evaluate State Model 
diagrams with Ciscoworks and CLI. Also was data collected by face to face interview 
with network experts to provide more in depth data (refer to Appendix B). Feedbacks on 
the effectiveness of managing the network evaluated. 
4.4 Ethical Considerations 
Participants were informed in writing that all original records would be stored in a 
locked room at Edith Cowan University and that the anonymity of the participants was 
guaranteed. A permission form signed by every participant prior to participate in the 
study. The interviewees were notified that their voices will be recorded only for study 
purposes. Participants were quite at ease during the study and enjoyed being part of the 
study. 
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5.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
5.1 An Evaluation of State Model Diagrams 
Based on the experimental networks, twenty participants experienced in networking 
were asked to evaluate the following NM tools: 
• State model diagrams (paper based only)
• Ciscoworks for Windows
• Command Line Interface
The participants were given a short introduction to the state model diagrams and 
provided with the opportunity to manage the network using these tools. They were then 
asked to complete a questionnaire and participate to interviews to obtain details about 
their work experience. The questionnaire and interview also included a number of 
questions most of which were based on the Likert scale (SA, A, D, SD, U) and the 
opportunity to provide any comments. 
Question 1 
Does the state model provide an easy way to understand the relationship between the 
devices of a network? 
Yes No Do not know 
100% 
Question 2 
The state model allows network administrators to have a better view of the entire 
network than other methods/models. 
1sD \u 
5%
Question 3 
The state model cannot be used to manage complex networks. 
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Question 4 
The integration of the state model with Ciscoworks simplifies the complexity of the 
network. 
/ sn 
J
u J 20% 
Question 5 
The state model does NOT assist efficient NM. 
Question 6 
The state model assists in network security management as a tool and as a result leads to 
more successful NM. 
Question 7 
I would NOT use the state model to manage my network. 
All the responses to the request for any comments were recorded and are as follows: 
Participant 1 
"Yes, state diagrams provide a clear, concise view of a network configuration 
which helps identify any security issues". 
Participant 2 
"Because the state model show you all the information in one go it would allow 
a better understanding of the network which in turn provides better security". 
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Participant 3 
"I have not previously seen a state model in my studies. I think it could have 
been useful if I had been exposed to it earlier. In the last unit I am studying 
called network troubleshooting, I think it provides an additional mechanism not 
only to troubleshoot but to be able to manage the security risks. I think the 
appropriate niche for this type of model will be in software where this 
information could be juxta positioned with statistics or breach attempts and 
intrusions whereby alters could be provided in these instances". 
Participant 4 
"State model gives a clear picture of each item/component and its configuration 
values. This model could be developed or further developed which can lead to a 
view/idea about each component. Saves time when it comes to working out 
network issues. Rather than using the command line method to view 
configuration values. Disadvantages are manual/paper based system can be 
damaged or lost". 
Participant 5 
"State model provides a layman's view where it is simple and easy to understand 
the network". 
Participant 6 
"Yes, this will help to identify any bugs in the design". 
Participant 7 
"State model provides clear understanding and creates a clear picture about the 
network. It will help to identify any bugs or faulty points in the network. I 
strongly believe this approach will lead to a world class product". 
Participant 8 
"Easy to understand the structure of the network and information flow through 
the separate interfaces which strongly helps to understand security needs". 
Participant 9 
"State model gives a clear overview of the entire network including IP 
addresses, MAC addresses and all other relevant information. It helps a lot to 
understand the security needs of the system, and exact interfaces to put all 
ACLs". 
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Participant 10 
"State model manages the network well but it does not address the security 
issues". 
Participant 11 
"State model is useful to efficiently manage the complexity of networks". 
Participant 12 
"State model is very good method of understanding the entire network but if the 
network becomes complex it will be very cumbersome or difficult to understand 
the state model and hence the network". 
Participant 13 
"State Model diagrams provide clear picture of the entire network. That will 
help to identify any faulty points in the network. I strongly believe this method 
provides an efficient network security management". 
Participant 14 
"This State Model is good for getting a good view of the network. However, 
further develop need". 
Participant 15 
"State Model might help to identify security if logs showing success of 
authorised traffic and unautherised attempts are identified regardless of success 
or other status. However, looks feasible, would need to be confirmed with 
logged attempts to degrade or bypass security". 
Participant 16 
"State Model clearly shows what sort of security permissions have given to the 
network". 
Participant 17 
"State Model might help to identify security risk by inserting extra fields to 
cover things like authentication methods, access list settings etc". 
Participant 18 
"Yes, State Model shows all information as a map rather than documentation. It 
is focus on the key points of the network". 
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Participant 19 
"For a secure network we need understand how it works. SM is a map we can 
look at to understand rather than read. SM is extremely helpful for beginners 
because it identifies all the necessary information that beginner wants to learn. 
Further development need to manage complex network". 
Participant 20 
"SM brings out the major points and less complex. Showing Access Control List 
(ACL) information is very helpful. SM has a potential value and very useful 
edition to other network management tools. So it is important but would not 
relay only to the State Model, combination with Ciscoworks give better network 
management. It is a additional tool rather than a tool". 
This is only a limited study based on a simple LAN with only twenty participants. 
However, the results are consistent. Of the twenty participants only one had reservations 
about the using the state model as a NM tool. 
5.2 Further Research 
In this study, the state model diagrams were paper based. A hyperlink implementation is 
currently being developed. This will allow users to more easily navigate between 
different devices and include or exclude detail as needed. A more extensive study 
involving a more complex network and more interviewees is currently being planned. 
5.3 Limitation of the Study 
This study was not based upon the NM tools or vendor specific NM tools. However, 
the author aware of the number of NM tools on the market and interoperability issues. 
The primary objectives of the research were to investigate the efficiency of NM tools 
and the integration of the State Model diagrams with Ciscmvorks and its effectiveness 
for security and effective NM. 
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6.0 CONCLUSION 
There are numerous NM tools available on the market, but complexities increased when 
they are used to manage or monitor a device. Even though various NM models and 
methods were introduced to reduce complexity, many studies indicate that this is in fact, 
not the case. Network security is a critical issue of modem NM. Even though the 
technology assists to reduce security risks, poor NM may mean that the network is 
insecure. Therefore the only safe solution is ensuring employees have the skills and 
understanding to maintain and manage network devices and security properly. 
Most of the NM devices use CLI which requires a good understanding and experience 
of the device to manage it. Lack of understanding reduces the likelihood of successful 
NM even if the right NM model or method is used. The SM approach includes 
implementation details derived from CLI commands, hence it is possible to easily verify 
and validate device operations. The research results clearly demonstrated that these 
models are diagrammatic and easy to use. Hence, using these models to document a 
network it is relatively easy to understand the purpose and structure of the devices. The 
state models employ leveling and hence provide hierarchical top down decomposition 
thereby controlling technical detail. This leads to more efficient NM. An evaluation of 
state model diagrams as a NM tool clearly demonstrated that it provided documentation, 
functionality not found in either the Command Line Interface or a standard NM tool. It 
also provided that the State model can integrated into a vendor based system to simplify 
network management. Finally new, diagrammatic State Model diagrams are very useful 
for secure NM environment. 
43 
7.0 REFERENCES 
3COM Corporation. (2005). 3Com Unveils Pervasive Network Security Strategy. 
Retrieved September 1, 2005, from 
http://www.3com.com/corpinfo/en_US/pressbox/press_release.jsp?CLOB_LOC 
ATION=PRESS _ RELEASE&INFO _ID= 172027 &cntry _ cd=US&lang_ cd=en-
US 
AT&T. (2005). History of Network Management. Retrieved August 31, 2005, from 
http://www.att.corn/history/nethistory/management.html 
Cisco Systems. (2002). Network Management Basics. Retrieved August 25, 2005, from 
http://www.cisco.corn/univercd/ cc/td/ doc/ cisintwk/ito _ doc/nmbasics.pdf 
Cohen, B. (2002, November 19). Buyer's guide: network performance tools. Retrieved 
September 5, 2005, from 
http://www.smallbusinesscomputing.com/testdrive/article.php/1503171 
Cummings, J. How to SOC it to the bad guys. Network World, 22(1 l), S18. Retrieved 
August 25, 2005, from ProQuest 5000 Database. 
Deri, L. (1996). Network Management for the 90s. Retrieved August 31, 2005, from 
http://www.sce.carleton.ca/netmanage/NMfor90s/SimpleNM.html 
Dubie, D. (2002, September). Reaping the rewards of best practices,. Network World, 
2005(0ctober 4), Network World. Retrieved October 4, from ProQuest 5000 
Database. 
Gillen, N.TMN, No more. Retrieved October 18, 2005, from 
http://www.greenwichtech.com/documents/pdf/TMN_ No_ More.pdf 
Gilmer, B. Network security. Broadcast Engineering, 47(7), 30. 
Retrieved August 24, 2005, from ProQuest 5000 Database. 
Hemmen, J. L. (2000). Models supporting the network management organisation. 
International Journal of Network Management., 11 (6), 299-314. 
Information Assurance Division. (2004, March 22). IS Terminology. Retrieved 
September 1, 2005, from http://ia.gordon.army.mil/iaso/lessonOl.htm 
Jingsha, H., & Yi-Shang, S. (1995, June 5). An SS7 network management model. 
Telephony, 228(23), 28. Retrieved August 28, 2005, from Expanded Academic 
Database. 
Kahani, M., & Beadle, H. (1997). Decentralised approaches for network management. 
InACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review. Wollongong NSW. 
Kammerer, A. Analysis leads to security. Greater Lansing Business Monthly, 32. 
Retrieved August 24, 2005, from ProQuest 5000 Database. 
Kay, R. (2002, September 16). Simple network management protocol. Computerworld, 
36(38), 48. Retrieved August 31, 2005, from ProQuest 5000 Database. 
44 
Lais, & Sarni. (2000, November 3). CIM-plifying network management with a new 
standard. Network World Canada, 10(21), 8.Retrieved September 1, 2005, from 
ProQuest 5000 Database. 
Lawson, D. Security best practices. Network World, 22(21), 45. 
Retrieved August 24, 2005, from ProQuest 5000 Database. 
Levine, D. E. Wide Open Wi-Fi. Security Technology & Design, 15(8), 54. 
Retrieved August 24, 2005, from ProQuest 5000 Database. 
Liebmann, L. (2000, June). MSPs make sense probably. Communications News, 37(6), 
118. Retrieved August 28, 2005, from Expanded Academic Database. 
Maj, S. P., & Kohli, G. (2004). "New State Models for Intemetworks Technology," 
Journal oflssues in Informing Science and Information Technology. 1, 385-392. 
Maj, S. P., Murphy, G., & Kohli, G. (2004). State models for Internetworking 
technologies. Paper presented at the 34th ASEE/IEEE Frontiers in Education 
Conference., Savannah, GA. 
Maj, S. P., Kohli, G., & Fetherston, T. (2005). ''A Pedagogical Evaluation of New State 
Model Diagrams for Teaching Internetwork Technologies". Paper presented at 
the 28th Australasian Computer Science Conference (ACSC2005), Newcastle, 
Australia. 
Maj, S. P., Ratnayake, S. A., & Tran, B. (2005). "State Model Diagrams as a Network 
Management Tool - An Evaluation". Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Telecommunications and Networking (TeNe 05), USA. 
Novell Releases ZENworks 7. (2005, August 22). eWeek. 
Retrieved August 28, 2005, from Expanded Academic Database. 
Ori, K. (2002). NTT Service Intergration Laboratories: Existing methods of monitoring 
network performance. Retrieved September 5, 2005, from 
http://www.ipsj .or .jp/ english/ saint/2002/workshop3/Katsunori _ ori. pdf 
OSI model. (n.d), Computer Desktop Encyclopedia. Retrieved August 30, 2005, from 
http://www.answers.com/topic/ osi-model 
Raman, L. (1998). OSI systems and network management. Communications Magazine, 
IEEE, 36(3), 46-53. Retrieved August 29, 2005, from, IEEE ASPA Database. 
Sarkar, A., & Verma, S. (2001, December 22). Downtime zero. Retrieved September 1, 
2005, from http://www.dqindia.com/content/Trends/101122202.asp 
Stallings, W. (1993). Network management. Los Alamitos: IEEE Computer Society 
· Press. 
Stoller, J. The perils ofremote access. Plant, 64(4), S27. Retrieved August 24, 2005, 
from ProQuest 5000 Database. 
Telecommunications Management Networks. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2005, from 
45 
http://www.cellsoft.de/telecom/tmn.htm 
Terplan, K. (1988). Network Management Evolution. Computer Communications., 
11(5). 
Retrieved October 19, 2005, from, IEEE ASPA Database. 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute. (2004). Network Management. Retrieved September 6, 
2005, from http://www.cs.wpi.edu/-cs4514/b98/week8-netmgmt/week8-
netmgmt.htm1 
Worthen, B. (2005, September). Watch for Pitfalls when applying ITIL. CIO Magazine. 
Retrieved October 18, 2005, from ProQuest 5000 Database. 
46 
APPENDIX A 
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
For all queries, please contact: 
Research Ethics Officer 
Edith Cowan University 
100 Joondalup Drive 
JOONDALUP WA 6027 
Phone: 6304 2170 
Fax: 6304 2661 
12 November 2005, 
Dear Participant, 
Information Letter for the Questionnaire 
This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a study of an investigation of 
Network Security Management Methods which I am conducting as a part of my 
Bachelor of Science Honours (Computer Science) degree in the School of 
Communication, Health and Science ,at Edith Cowan University, under the supervision 
of Associate Professor Dr Paul Maj. I would like to provide you with more information 
about this project and what your involvement would result in if you decide to take part. 
Network Management (NM) is concerned with reducing complexity and managing cost. 
The traditional NM tools and techniques are based on the Open System Interconnection 
(OSI) NM model. However, several drawbacks have been identified when managing a 
network using traditional NM tools. Network security is a major issue when managing a 
network. Even though the technology assists to reduce security risks, unless properly 
managed, the security measures may not do the job as expected. In order to manage the 
network easily, network administrators must have a good knowledge of the network 
devices and their operation. Though, most Intemetworking devices are generally based 
on the Command-Line Interface (CLI). The complexity of the CLI affects the learning 
phase, which may result in the lack o ability to manage the device. 
State Model (SM) is a new method, which may assists in managing the network. This 
new method may provide functionality not currently offered by current NM tools. 
Furthermore it may be possible to integrate the SM with NM tools. The benefit of the 
State model is that it give us the complete picture of the network, another word, it is 
diagrammatic, allowing us to view the physical as well as the logical topologies. 
The main aim of the research is to find out whether the State model assists in network 
security management to simplify the complexity of the networks and as a result leads to 
more successful network management. 
Taking part in this study is voluntary. The questionnaire will be conduct in the Cisco 
Intemetworking laboratory, room 13.134, at Mount Lawley campus. The questionnaire 
may take approximately 30 minutes. You have the right not to answer any of the 
questions. I promise you will not find this questionnaire as difficult. Furthermore, you 
may decide to withdraw from this study at any time. 
All information you provide is completely confidential. Your name will not appear in 
any thesis or report resulting from this study, however, with your permission 
anonymous quotations may be used. Data collected during this study will be kept for a 
minimum of 5 years and no one can gain access to the information except my self and 
my supervisor Dr. S. P. Maj. There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a 
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participant in this study. You will have the opportunity to reflect on your own learning 
by participating to this study. Also your responses may provide useful information to 
the network managers and administrators searching for ways to minimize costs and 
complexity when managing the network. Also may helpful to the students on 
networking courses. 
If you have any questions regarding this research or would like further information to 
help you in reaching a decision about participation, please do not hesitate to contact me 
on  or my email .You can also contact my 
supervisor, Associate Professor Dr Paul Maj on (  or alternatively you can 
email him on p.maj((u,ecu.edu.au . Further, if you have any concerns or complaints about 
the research project and wish to talk to an independent person, you may contact: 
Research Ethics Officer 
Human Research Ethics Officer 
Edith Cowan University 
100 Joondalup Drive 
JOONDALUP WA 6027 
Phone: (08) 6304 2170 
Email: research.ethics@ecu.edu.au, 
If you would like to participate, please sign the fuformed Consent Document and return 
it to me.Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated. 
Yours sincerely, 
Shamila Ratnayake. 
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Informed Consent Document 
I have read the information presented in the information letter for the study of an 
investigation of Network Security Management Methods being conducted by Mr Shamila 
Ratnayake of School of Communication, Health and Science at Edith Cowan University. I 
have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory 
answers to my questions, and any additional details I wanted. 
I am aware that I have the option of allowing the information from the questionnaire may 
be included in the thesis and/or publications to come from this research, with the 
understanding that the quotations will be anonymous. 
I was informed that all information , I provide is completely confidential and I may 
withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the researcher. 
I was informed that if I have any comments or concerns resulting from my participation in 
this study, I may contact either project supervisor on  email 
p.maj@ecu.edu.au or office of Ethics Research at Edith Cowan University on (08) 6304 
2170, email research.ethics@ecu.edu.au. 
I, ______________ freely do agree/ do not agree to participate in this 
project. 
I do agree/ do not agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication 
that comes from this research. 
I I 
Participant's Signature Date 
I I 
Investigator's Signature Date 
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Questionnaire: Network Security Management Methods 
01) What is your job title? Circle one. 
a) Network Expert 
b) Network Student 
c) Other; Please specify _________________ _ 
02) Do you have experience in network management area? Circle one. 
a) Yes 
b) No (Please skip questions 03 and 04. Go directly to question 05) 
If Yes: How many years of experience do you have? 
----------
03) Which methods/ models/ tools you use to manage your network? eg. 
Cisco Works 
04) What methods do you use to identify security risks in you network? 
(Please skip question 05. Go directly to question 06) 
05) Which kind of experience do you have in the networking field? 
06) Does the State Model provide an easy way to understand the relationships 
between the devices of the network? Circle one. 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Do not know 
If Yes: Do you think State Model approach helps to identify any security risk? 
Below each of the statements presented below, please indicate whether you Strongly 
Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D), Strongly Disagree (SD), or are Undecided (U). 
07) The State Model allows network administrators to have a better view of the 
entire network than other methods/ models. 
SA A D SD u 
08) The State Model cannot be used to manage complex networks. 
SA A D SD u 
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09) The integration of the State Model with the Cisco Works makes the complexity 
of the network easier to understand. 
SA A D SD u 
10) The State Model does not provide efficient network management. 
SA A D SD u 
11) The State Model assists in network security management as a tool and as a result 
leads to more successful network management. 
SA A D SD u 
12) I would not use the State Model to manage my network. 
SA A D SD u 
13) Comments: 
Thank you very much for your help. 
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APPENDIXB 
12 November 2005, 
Information Letter for the Interview 
Dear Participant, 
This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a study of an investigation of 
Network Security Management Methods which I am conducting as a part of my 
Bachelor of Science Honours (Computer Science) degree in the School of 
Communication, Health and Science at Edith Cowan University, under the supervision 
of Associate Professor Dr Paul Maj. I would like to provide you with more information 
about this project and what your involvement would result in if you decide to take part. 
Network Management (NM) is concerned with reducing complexity and managing cost. 
The traditional NM tools and techniques are based on the Open System Interconnection 
(OSI) NM model. However, several drawbacks have been identified when managing a 
network using traditional NM tools. Network security is a major issue when managing a 
network. Even though the technology assists to reduce security risks, unless properly 
managed, the security measures may not do the job as expected. In order to manage the 
network easily, network administrators must have a good knowledge of the network 
devices and their operation. Though, most Internetworking devices are generally based 
on the Command-Line Interface (CLI). The complexity of the CLI affects the learning 
phase, which may result in the lack o ability to manage the device. 
State Model (SM) is a new method, which may assists in managing the network. This 
new method may provide functionality not currently offered by current NM tools. 
Furthermore it may be possible to integrate the SM with NM tools. The benefit of the 
State model is that it give us the complete picture of the network, another word, it is 
diagrammatic, allowing us to view the physical as well as the logical topologies. 
The main aim of the research is to find out whether the State model assists in network 
security management to simplify the complexity of the networks and as a result leads to 
more successful network management. 
Taking part in this study is voluntary. The interview will be conduct in the Cisco 
Internetworking laboratory, room 13.134, at Mount Lawley campus. The interview may 
take about 30 minutes. You have the right not to answer any of the interview questions. 
Furthermore, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time. 
With. your permission, I will tape~record your conversation to assist my collection of 
data for analysis later. All information you provide is completely confidential. Your 
name will not appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study, however, with 
your permission anonymous quotations may be used. Data collected during this study 
will be kept for a minimum of 5 years and no one can gain access to the information 
except my self and my supervisor Dr. S. P. Maj. There are no known or anticipated risks 
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to you as a participant in this study. You will have the opportunity to reflect on your 
own learning by participating to this study. Also your responses may provide useful 
information to the network managers and administrators searching for ways to minimize 
costs and complexity when managing the network. Also may helpful to the students on 
networking courses. 
If you have any questions regarding this research or would like further information to 
help you in reaching a decision about participation, please do not hesitate to contact me 
on or my email  You can also contact my 
supervisor, Associate Professor Dr Paul Maj on or alternatively you can 
email him on p.mai@ecu.edu.au . Further, if you have any concerns or complaints about 
the research project and wish to talk to an independent person, you may contact: 
Research Ethics Officer 
Human Research Ethics Officer 
Edith Cowan University 
100 Joondalup Drive 
JOONDALUP WA 6027 
Phone: (08) 6304 2170 
Email: research.ethics@ecu.edu.au · 
If you would like to participate, please sign the Informed Consent Document and return 
it to me.Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated. 
Yours sincerely, 
Shamila Ratnayake. 
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Informed Consent Document 
I have read the information presented in the information letter for the study of an 
investigation of Network Security Management Methods being conducted by Mr Shamila 
Ratnayake of School of Communication, Health and Science at Edith Cowan University. I 
have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory 
answers to my questions, and any additional details I wanted. 
I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be tape-recorded and the 
information from the interview may be included in the thesis and/or publications to come 
from this research, with the understanding that the quotations will be anonymous. 
I was informed that all information I provide is completely confidential and I may 
withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the researcher. 
I was informed that if I have any comments or concerns resulting from my participation in 
this study, I may contact either project supervisor on  email 
p.maj@ecu.edu.au or office of Ethics Research at Edith Cowan University on (08) 6304 
2170, email research.ethics@ecu.edu.au. 
I, ______________ freely do agree/ do not agree to participate in this 
project. 
I do agree/ do not agree to have my interview tape-recorded. 
I do agree/ do not agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication 
that comes from this research. 
I I 
Participant's Signature Date 
I I 
Investigator's Signature Date 
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Interview Questions: Network Security Management :Methods 
01) What is your job title? 
a) Network Expert 
b) Network Student 
c) Other; Please specify 
------------------
02) Do you have experience in network management area? 
c) Yes 
d) No (Please skip questions 03, 04, 05, 06 and 07. Go directly to 
question 08) 
If Yes: How many years of experience do you have? 
----------
03) Which methods/ models/ tools you use to manage your network? eg. 
Cisco Works 
04) How often you use these tools'in your day to day work? 
05) Areas in which you use these tools? e.g. connectivity issues, availability, change 
configuration etc. 
06) Do you use the tools for reporting to management or fault finding? 
07) What are the issues with current network management tools? eg. Product 
specific or generic 
(Please skip question 08. Go directly to question 09) 
08) Which kind of experience do you have in the networking field? 
09) Does the State Model provide an easy way to understand the relationships 
between the devices of the network? 
d) Yes 
e) No 
f) Do not know 
If Yes: Do you think State Model approach helps to identify any security risk? 
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Below each of the statements presented below, please indicate whether you Strongly 
Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D), Strongly Disagree (SD), or are Undecided (U). 
10) The State Model allows network administrators to have a better view of the 
entire network than other methods/ models. 
SA A D SD u 
11) The State Model cannot be used to manage complex networks. 
SA A D SD u 
12) The integration of the State Model with the Cisco Works makes the complexity 
of the network easier to understand. 
SA A D SD u 
13) The State Model does not provide efficient network management. 
SA A D SD u 
14) The State Model assists in network security management as a tool and as a result 
leads to more successful network management. 
SA A D SD u 
15) I would not use the State Model to manage my network. 
SA A D SD u 
16) Comments: 
Thank you very much for your help. 
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APPENDIXC 
Experiment 1 
CiscoWorks server: 
C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>)i;~'.g~~g~4:f;i:ttl.:q.j 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 00-02-55-7A-6F-D3 
IP Address. . . 192.168.1.1 
PC 1: 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default Gateway 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.1.2 
C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>ff;ig'g~)}l&"fg)h~ 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 00-02-55-73-B2-3A 
IP Address. . . 192.168.2.1 
PC 2: 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default Gateway 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.2.2 
C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>t3tjlG0B'~':i:.§t'\,Jc~1;i 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 00-02-55-73-08-24 
IP Address. . . 192.168.3.1 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default Gateway 
PIX Firewall: 
PIXl(config)# ~f:l,£W):i';t;i'.tj 
PIX Version 6.3(4) 
interface ethernetO lOOfull 
interface ethernetl lOOfull 
interface ethernet2 lOOfull 
nameif ethernetO outside securityO 
nameif ethernetl inside securitylOO 
nameif ethernet2 dmz security50 
ip address outside 192.168.3.2 255.255.255.0 
ip address inside 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 
ip address dmz 192.168.2.2 255.255.255.0 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.3.2 
static (inside,outside) 192.168.3.99 192.168.1.1 netmask 
255.255.255.255 0 0 
static (inside,dmz) 192.168.2.99 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 0 
0 
static (dmz,outside) 192.168.3.98 192.168.2.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 
0 0 
sump-server host inside 192.168.1.1 
snmp·-server community public 
snmp-server enable traps 
end 
PIXl (config) # ;J1i~}~@fi17!:~ 
interface ether:Q.etl "inside" is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is i82.5'59 ethernet, address is 0012. d96f. db47 
IP address .192.168.1.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
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PIXl (config) # ~gQii~fiii.t· eZ) 
interface ethernet2 "dmz" is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 000e.Oc66.6bdb 
IP address 192.168.2.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
PIXl (config) # ~nOWC~irit;l~ll 
interface ethernetO "outside" is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db46 
IP address 192.168.3.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
PIXl(config)# !~~iQ¥t~ 
inside 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.2 1 CONNECT static 
dmz 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.2 1 CONNECT static 
outside 192.168.3.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.3.2 1 CONNECT static 
PIXl(config)# i~W~~ 
outside 192.168.3.1 0002.5573.1167 
inside 192.168.1.1 0002.557a.6fd3 
dmz 192.168.2.1 0002.5573.b7f2 
PIXl (config) # ~ligw-~~ 
3 in use, 3 most used 
Global 192.168.2.99 Local 192.168.1.1 
Global 192.168.3.99 Local 192.168.1.1 
Global 192.168.3.98 Local 192.168.2.1 
PIXl(config)# ~J}~w[cg~~ 
1 in use, 1 most used 
TCP out 192.168.3.1:80 in 192.168.2.1:1325 idle 0:00:31 Bytes 1253 
flags UIO 
PIXl(config)# ;s~<:>,W.~yat',}£ 
static (inside,outside) 192.168.3.99 192.168.1.1 netmask 
255.255.255.255 0 0 
static (inside,dmz) 192.168.2.99 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 0 
0 
static (dmz,outside) 192.168.3.98 192.168.2.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 
0 0 
Experiment 2 
CiscoWorks Server: 
C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>i~~~n.Ei~~i;al,~ 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 
IP Address ... 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default Gateway 
PC 1: 
00-02-55-7A-1C-39 
192. 168 .1. 1 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.1.2 
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>iP~n~-.1~~1m 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 
IP Address ... 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default Gateway 
00-02-55-73-06-49 
192.168.2.1 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.2.2 
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PC 2: 
C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>::ifJfg-gJfttf1{-1i 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 
IP Address ... 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default Gateway 
00-02-55-73-08-67 
192.168.2.1 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.2.2 
PIX Firewall: 
PIX(config)# ~Ji~~ 
PIX Version 6.3(4) 
interface ethernetO lOOfull 
interface ethernetl lOOfull 
interface ethernet2 lOOfull 
nameif ethernetO outside securityO 
nameif ethernetl inside securitylOO 
nameif ethernet2 dmz security50 
access-list ACLIN permit tcp any host 
access-list ACLIN permit tcp any host 
192.168.3.99 
192.168.3.98 
access-list ACLIN permit icmp any any echo 
access-list ACLIN permit icmp any host 192.168.3.99 
access-list ACLIN permit icmp any host 192.168.3.98 
access-list ACLIN2 permit tcp any any 
access-list ACLIN2 permit icmp any any echo 
eq WWW 
eq WWW 
echo-reply 
echo-reply 
access-list ACLIN2 permit icmp any host 192.168.1.99 echo-reply 
access-list ACLIN2 permit icmp any any echo-reply 
ip address outside 192.168.3.2 255.255.255.0 
ip address inside 192.168.2.2 255.255.255.0 
ip address dmz 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 
global (outside) 1 192.168.3.10-192.168.3.20 netmask 255.255.255.0 
global (dmz) 1 192.168.1.10-192.168.1.20 netmask 255.255.255.0 
nat (inside) 1 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 0 0 
static (dmz,outside) 192.168.3.98 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 
0 0 
static (inside,dmz) 192.168.1.99 192.168.2.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 0 
0 
static (inside,outside) 192.168.3.99 192.168.2.1 netmask 
255.255.255.255 0 0 
access-group ACLIN in interface outside 
access-group ACLIN2 in interface dmz 
route outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.3.1 1 
snmp-server host inside 192.168.1.1 
snmp-server community public 
snmp-server enable traps 
end 
PIX(config)# ~~~Ji'§aj 
interface ethernetl "inside" is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db47 
IP address 192.168.2.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
PIX(config)# ~W:~~frti?~ 
interface ethernetO "outside" is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db46 
IP address 192.i68.3.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
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PIX (config) # ~hc,~)Ifqit'j;~ 
outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.3.1 1 OTHER static 
dmz 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.2 1 CONNECT static 
inside 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.2 1 CONNECT static 
outside 192.168.3.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.3.2 1 CONNECT static 
PIX(config)# ~~~~~~~~~ 
3 in use, 3 most used 
Global 192.168.3.99 Local 192.168.2.1 
Global 192.168.3.98 Local 192.168.1.1 
Global 192.168.1.99 Local 192.168.2.1 
PIX(config)# ~~~j;fifj;j 
outside 192.168.3.1 000c.309e.6481 
inside 192.168.2.1 0002.5573.b7f2 
dmz 192.168.1.1 0002.557a.6fd3 
PIX (config) # ~fiJ'>WS<'2:A"t'! 
1 in use, 6 most used 
TCP out 192.168.4.1:80 in 192.168.1.1:1895 idle 0:02:18 Bytes 1253 
flags UIO 
PIX (config) # ~!iqWi.Stat:i'.;EJ; 
static (dmz,outside) 192.168.3,.98 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 
0 0 
static (inside,dmz) 192.168.1.99 192.168.2.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 0 
0 
static (inside,outside) 192.168.3.99 192.168.2.1 netmask 
255.255.255.255 0 0 
PIX (config) # ~:gRy;i,.~Jig)'i~~ 
global (outside) 1 192.168.3.10-192.168.3.20 netmask 255.255.255.0 
global (dmz) 1 192.168.1.10-192.168.l.20 netmask 255.255.255.0 
PIX(config)# it.ifw:~~j 
nat (inside) 1 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 0 0 
PIX (config) # lff1'li~¥ti;.a2'¢~J£l:t~~~t:f:J 
access-list cached ACL log flows: total O, denied O (deny-flow-max 
1024) 
access-list 
access-list 
(hitcnt=7) 
access-list 
(hitcnt=7) 
access-list 
access-list 
(hitcnt=l6) 
access-list 
(hitcnt=l2) 
alert-interval 300 
ACLIN; 5 elements 
ACLIN line 1 permit 
ACLIN line 2 permit 
ACLIN line 3 permit 
ACLIN line 4 permit 
ACLIN line 5 permit 
access-list ACLIN2; 4 elements 
tcp 
tcp 
icmp 
icmp 
icmp 
any host 192.168.3.99 eq WWW 
any host 10') 1t::Q ~ QQ -'-_.,'- • .J..U V • ..J •JV eq "f./v"v'wTT// 
any any echo (hitcnt=213) 
any host 192.168.3.99 echo-reply 
any host 192.168.3.98 echo-reply 
access-list ACLIN2 line 1 permit tcp any any (hitcnt=l5) 
access-list ACLIN2 line 2 permit icmp any any echo (hitcnt=l09) 
access-list ACLIN2 line 3 permit icmp any host 192.168.1.99 echo-reply 
(hitcnt=28) 
acce·ss-list ACLIN2 line 4 permit icmp any any echo-reply (hitcnt=8) 
PIX (config) # t§:ifRWl1~~~c~a'§!F~ 
access-group ACLIN in interface outside 
access-group ACLIN2 in interface dmz 
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Router: 
Rou ter#$_ll:<>w_'\"ii{"~i'.~/;aj 
FastEthernet0/1 is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is AmdFE, address is OOOc.309e.6481 (bia 000c.309e.6481) 
Internet address is 192.168.3.1/24 
Rou ter#i~wid.11tr~l~¥~ 
FastEthernet0/0 is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is AmdFE, address is 000c.309e.6480 (bia 000c.309e.6480) 
Internet address is 192.168.4.2/24 
Rou ter#~iNJ,e:r:ti~ 
Building configuration ... 
hostname Router 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
ip address 192.168.4.2 255.255.255.0 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
ip address 192.168.3.1 255.255.255.0 
router rip 
network 192.168.3.0 
network 192.168.4.0 
snmp-server community public RO 
snmp-server community private RW 
snmp-server enable traps tty 
end 
C 192.168.4.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/0 
C 192.168.3.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/1 
Router# Sf!,Q_W)ti~E 
Protocol Address 
Internet 192.168.3.99 
FastEthernet0/1 
Internet 192.168.3.98 
FastEthernet0/1 
Internet 192.168.3.2 
FastEthernet0/1 
Internet 192.168.3.1 
FastEthernet0/1 
Internet 192.168.4.1 
FastEthernet0/0 
Internet 192.168.4.2 
FastEthernet0/0 
Router# 
Age (min) 
106 
Hardware Addr 
0012.d96f.db46 
Type 
ARPA 
Interface 
Experiment 3: 
CiscoWorks Server: 
105 
7 
7 
0012.d96f.db46 
0012.d96f.db46 
OOOc.309e.6481 
0002.5573.1167 
000c.309e.6480 
ARPA 
ARPA 
AP.PA 
ARPA 
ARPA 
C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>----aif~lc~r~t~ 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 00-40-96-A6-7D-64 
IP Address. . . 192.168.4.1 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default_Gateway 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.4.2 
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PC 1: 
----
c: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>[i}'])~~li~§'!'i1~1il! 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 00-02-55-7A-81-25 
IP Address. . . 192.168.1.1 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default Gateway 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.1.2 
PC 2: 
C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>iiB~'il!~gJ;~;~;:k~ 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 00-02-55-73-0B-48 
IP Address. . . 192.168.3.1 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default Gateway 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.3.2 
PIX Firewall: (***Same configurations for the Experiment 4***) 
PIX(config)# 
interface ethernetO lOOfull 
interface ethernetl lOOfull 
interface ethernet2 lOOfull 
nameif ethernetO outside securityO 
nameif ethernetl inside securitylOO 
nameif ethernet2 dmz security50 
access-list ACLIN permit tcp any host 
access-list ACLIN permit tcp any host 
192.168.3.99 
192.168.3.98 
access-list ACLIN permit icmp any any echo 
access-list ACLIN permit icmp any host 192.168.3.99 
access-list ACLIN permit icmp any host 192.168.3.98 
access-list ACLIN2 permit tcp any any 
access-list ACLIN2 permit icmp any any echo 
eq WWW 
eq WWW 
echo-reply 
echo-reply 
access-list ACLIN2 permit icmp any host 192 .168 .1. 99 echo-reply 
access-list ACLIN2 permit icmp any any echo-reply 
ip address outside 192.168.3.2 255.255.255.0 
ip address inside 192.168.2.2 255.255.255.0 
ip address dmz 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 
global (outside) 1 192.168.3.10-192.168.3.20 netmask 255.255.255.0 
global (dmz) 1 192.168.1.10-192.168.l.20 nerm3Qk 2~~.2~~.?~~.n 
nat (inside) 1 192.168.4.0 255.255.255.0 0 0 
static (dmz,outside) 192.168.3.98 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 
0 0 
static (inside,dmz) 192.168.1.99 192.168.4.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 O 
0 
static (inside,outside) 192.168.3.99 192.168.4.1 netmask 
255.255.255.255 0 0 
access-group ACLIN in interface outside 
acce·ss-group ACLIN2 in interface dmz 
route inside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.2.1 1 
snmp-server host inside 192.168.4.1 
snmp-server community public 
snmp-server enabl~ traps 
end 
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PIX(config)# 
inside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.2.1 1 OTHER static 
dmz 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.2 1 CONNECT static 
inside 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.2 1 CONNECT static 
outside 192.168.3.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.3.2 1 CONNECT static 
PIX(config)# 
interface ethernetl "inside" is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db47 
IP address 192.168.2.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
PIX (config) # 
interface ethernet2 "dmz" is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 000e.Oc66.6bdb 
IP address 192.168.1.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
PIX(config)# 
interface ethernetO "outside" is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db46 
IP address 192.168.3.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
PIX(config)# 
3 in use, 5 most used 
Global 192.168.3.99 Local 192.168.4.1 
Global 192.168.3.98 Local 192.168.1.1 
Global 192.168.1.99 Local 192.168.4.1 
PIX(config)# 
outside 192.168.3.1 0002.5573.1167 
inside 192.168.2.1 000c.309e.6480 
dmz 192.168.1.1 0002.5573.b7f2 
PIX(config)# 
static (dmz,outside) 192.168.3.98 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 
0 0 
static (inside,dmz) 192.168.1.99 192.168.4.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 O 
0 
static (inside,outside) 192.168.3.99 192.168.4.1 netmask 
255.255.255.255 0 0 
PIX(config)# 
global (outside) 1 192.168.3.10-192.168.3.20 netmask 255.255.255.0 
global (dmz) 1 192.168.1.10-192.168.1.20 netmask 255.255.255.0 
PIX(config)# 
nat (inside) 1 192.168.4.0 255.255.255.0 0 0 
PIX(config)# 
2 in use, 6 most used 
TCP out 192.168.1.1:1381 in 192.168.4.1:80 idle 0:00:19 Bytes 1255 
flags UIOB 
TCP out 192.168.3.1:80 in 192.168.1.1:1382 idle 0:00:11 Bytes 1253 
flags UIO 
Router: (***Same configurations for the Experiment 4***) 
FastEthernetO 1 up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is AmdFE, address is OOOc.309e.6481 (bia OOOc.309e.6481) 
Internet address is 192.168.4.2/24 
Router#~)l~~~~j';ilai!g'I 
FastEtherrietO/Oi~-~p, line protocol is up 
Hardware is AmdFE, address is 000c.309e.6480 (bia 000c.309e.6480) 
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Internet address is 192.168.2.1/24 
Protocol Address Age (min) Hardware Addr Type 
Internet 192.168.2.2 5 0012.d96f.db47 ARPA 
FastEthernet0/0 
Internet 192.168.2.1 000c.309e.6480 ARPA 
FastEthernet0/0 
Internet 192.168.4.1 5 0002.557a.6fd3 ARPA 
FastEthernet0/1 
Internet 192.168.4.2 oooc.309e.6481 ARPA 
FastEthernet0/1 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, 
C 192.168.4.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/1 
S 192.168.1.0/24 [1/0] via 192.168.2.2 
C 192.168.2.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/0 
S 192.168.3.0/24 [1/0] via 192.168.2.2 
Router#~~8Wmim 
Building configuration ... 
hostname Router 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
ip address 192.168.4.2 255.255.255.0 
ip classless 
ip route 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.2 
ip route 192.168.3.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.2 
snmp-server community public RO 
snmp-server community private RW 
snmp-server enable traps tty 
end 
Switch: (***Same configurations £or the Experiment 4***) 
Mac Address Table 
Vlan Mac Address Type Ports 
-----------
1 0002.557a.6fd3 DYNAMIC Fa0/1 
1 oooc.309e.6481 DYNAMIC Fa0/2 
Total Mac Addresses for this criterion: 2 
up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is Fast Ethernet, address is 000c.30df.a281 (bia 
OOOc·. 30df. a281) 
up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is Fast Ethernet, address is 000c.30df.a282 (bia 
000c.30df.a282) 
Interface 
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Switch_ B#§iifjj;,;r r;i.t:ij 
hostname Switch B 
interface Vlanl 
ip address 192.168.4.12 255.255.255.0 
snmp-server community public RO 
snmp-server community private RW 
end 
Experiment 4: 
CiscoWorks Server: 
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>~~~~~~;;!~~~ 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 
PC 1: 
IP Address. 
Subnet Mask. 
Default Gateway 
.00-40-96-A6-7D-64 
192.168.4.1 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.4.2 
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>~B'g~!fttsii~~j 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 00-02-55-73-B7-F2 
IP Address. 192.168.1.1 
PC 2: 
Subnet Mask . 
Default Gateway 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.1.2 
C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>iip"oo:ti¥:i~gS~¥.i~'.!J 
Windows IP Configuration - --
Physical Address. 00-02-55-73-11-67 
IP Address. 192.168.3.1 
Subnet Mask. 
Default Gateway 
Access Point: 
ap#~llw~'~11.ij 
Building configuration ... 
version 12.2 
hostname ap 
interface DotllRadiol 
ssid ML13.134-AP4 
authentication open 
guest-mode 
interface BVIl 
ip address 192.168.4.10 255.255.255.0 
ip radius source-interface BVIl 
snmp-server community public RO 
snmp-server community private RW 
snmp-server enable traps tty 
end 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.3.2 
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BVIl is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is BVI, address is 000b.5f55.3972 (bia 000b.45ca.61c5) 
Internet address is 192.168.4.10/24 
DotllRadiol is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is 802.llA Radio, address is OOOb.46ca.61c5 (bia 
OOOb.46ca.61c5) 
Experiment 5: 
PC 1: 
C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>!}~~~~~lsijl!f!ii! 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 
IP Address ... 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default Gateway 
PC 2: 
00-02-55-73-B7-F2 
192.168.1.1 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.1.3 
C: \Documents and Settings\Admi:p.istrator>~'p'\i~~~~g{,wfa\1 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 00-02-55-73-11-67 
IP Address. . . 192.168.1.2 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default Gateway 
CiscoWorks Server: 
C:\Documents and 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 
IP Address ... 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default Gateway 
PC 4: 
C:\Documents and Settings 
Windows IP Configuration 
Physical Address. 
IP A.ddress. . . 
Subnet Mask . . 
Default Gateway 
AccessPoint 1: 
hostname ap 
interface DotllRadiol 
ssid ML13.134-AP5 
authentication open 
-guest-mode 
interface BVIl 
ip address 192.168.1.10 255.255.255.0 
snmp-server community public RO 
snmp-server community private RW 
snmp-server enabl·e. traps tty 
end 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.1.3 
00-02-55-73-20-24 
192.168.5.1 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.5.3 
00-02-55-73-B2-3A 
192 168 5.2 
255.255.255.0 
192.168.5.3 
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BVIl is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is BVI, address is 0013.la32.97eb (bia 0011.20ee.d2bd) 
Internet address is 192.168.1.10/24 
DotllRadiol is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is 802.llA Radio, address is 0011.20ee.d2bd (bia 
OOll. 20ee. d2bd) 
Switch 1: 
switchl# 
Mac Address Table 
Vlan Mac Address Type Ports 
-----------
1 0012.d96f.db47 DYNAMIC Fa0/2 
1 .0013. la32. 97eb DYNAMIC Fa0/1 
1 0040.96a6.7df2 DYNAMIC Fa0/1 
Total Mac Addresses for this criterion: 3 
FastEthernetO 1 is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is Fast Ethernet, address is 0009.b7c8.1841 (bia 
0009.b7c8.1841) 
switchl# 
interface Vlanl 
ip address 192.168.1.11 255.255.255.0 
snmp-server engineID local 8000000903000009B7C81841 
snmp-server community public RO 
snmp-server community private RW 
end 
PIX Firewall 1: 
PIXl(config)# 
PIX Version 6.3(4) 
interface ethernetO lOOfull 
interface ethernetl lOOfull 
nameif ethernetO outside securityO 
nameif ethernetl inside securitylOO 
hostname PIXl 
access-list ACLIN permit icmp any any echo 
access-list ACLIN permit icmp any host 192.168.2.99 
access-list ACLIN permit tcp any host 192.168.2.99 
access-list ACLIN permit icmp any host 192.168.2.98 
access-list ACLIN permit tcp any host 192.168.2.98 
ip address outside 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0 
ip address inside 192.168.1.3 255.255.255.0 
echo-reply 
eq WWW 
echo-reply 
eq WWW 
static (inside,outside) 192.168.2.99 192.168.1.1 netmask 
255.255.255.255 o.o 
static- (inside, out::·side) 192 .168. 2. 98 192 .168 .1. 2 netmask 
255.255.255.255 0 0 
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access-group ACLIN in interface outside 
route outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.2.2 1 
snmp-server host inside 192.168.5.1 
snmp-server community public 
snmp-server enable traps 
end 
PIXl(config)# 
outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.2.2 1 OTHER static 
inside 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.3 1 CONNECT static 
outside 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.1 1 CONNECT static 
PIXl(config)# 
2 in use, 3 most used 
TCP out 192.168.4.98:80 in 192.168.1.1:1053 
flags UIO 
TCP out 192.168.4.99:80 in 192.168.1.1:1055 
flags UIO 
PIXl (config) # 
2 in use, 3 most used 
TCP out 192.168.4.99:80 in 192.168.1.2:1063 
flags UIO 
TCP out 192.168.4.98:80 in 192.168.1.2:1065 
flags UIO 
PIXl(config)# 
2 in use, 2 most used 
Global 192.168.2.99 Local 192 .168 .1.1 
Global 192.168.2.98 Local 192.168.1.2 
PIXl(config)# 
outside 192.168.2.2 0009.b765.29a0 
inside 192.168.1.1 0002.5573.163c 
inside 192.168.1.2 0002.557a.6e7e 
PIXl(config)# 
idle 0:00:27 Bytes 1255 
idle 0:00:06 Bytes 1255 
idle 0:00:19 Bytes 1255 
idle 0:00:03 Bytes 1255 
access-list cached ACL log flows: total O, denied O (deny-flow-max 
1024) 
alert-interval 300 
access-list ACLIN; 5 elements 
access-list ACLIN line 1 permit icmp any any echo (hitcnt=29) 
access-list ACLIN line 2 permit icmp any host 192.168.2.99 echo-reply 
(hi tcnt=3 6) 
access-list ACLIN line 3 permit tcp any host 192.168.2.99 eg www 
(hitcnt=l) 
access-list ACLIN line 4 permit icmp any host 192.168.2.98 echo-reply 
(hitcnt=8) 
access-list ACLIN line 5 permit tcp any host 192.168.2.98 eg www 
(hitcnt=l) 
PIXl(config)# 
static (inside, 
255.255.255.255 0 0 
192.168.2.99 192.168.1.1 netmask 
static (inside,outside) 192.168.2.98 192.168.1.2 netmask 
255.255.255.255 0 0 
PIXl(config)# 
interface ethernetl 11 11 is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db47 
IP address 192. °1'68 .1. 3, subnet mask 255. 255. 255. O 
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PIXl(config)# 
interface ethernetO "outside" is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db46 
IP address 192.168.2.1, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
Router 1: 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B -
BGP 
R 192.168.4.0/24 [120/1] via 192.168.3.2, 00:00:25, Serial0/0 
C 192.168.2.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/0 
C 192.168.3.0/24 is directly connected, Serial0/0 
hostname routerl 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
ip address 192.168.3.1 255.255.255.0 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
ip address 192.168.2.2 255.255.255.0 
router rip 
network 192.168.2.0 
network 192.168.3.0 
snmp-server community public RO 
snmp-server community private RW 
snmp-server enable traps tty 
end 
Protocol Address 
Internet 192.168.2.99 
FastEthernet0/1 
Internet 192.168.2.2 
FastEthernet0/1 
Internet 192.168.3.2 
FastEthernet0/0 
Internet 192.168.3.1 
FastEthernet0/0 
Internet 192.168.2.1 
FastEthernet0/1 
Age (min) 
34 
Hardware Addr 
0012.d96f.db46 
Type 
ARPA 
Interface 
000c.309e.6481 
34 oooc.30e2.c620 
000c.309e.6480 
15 0012. d96f. db46 
routerl#~,~~lffil~S§A~I! 
FastEthernet0/1 is up, line protocol is up 
ARPA 
ARPA 
ARPA 
ARPA 
Hardware is AmdFE, address is 000c.309e.6481 (bia 000c.309e.6481) 
Internet address is 192.168.2.2/24 
routerl#wlt~~,,-~m:~ey~r~ 
FastEthernet0/0 is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is AmdFE, address is 000c.309e.6480 (bia 000c.309e.6480) 
Internet address is 192.168.3.1/24 
Access Point 2: 
ap#iliwt11~1 
Building configuration ... 
hostname ap 
interface DotllRadiol 
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ssid ML13.134-AP4 
authentication open 
guest-mode 
interface BVIl 
ip address 192.168.4.10 255.255.255.0 
ip radius source-interface BVIl 
snmp-server community public RO 
snmp-server community private RW 
snmp-server enable traps tty 
end 
up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is BVI, address is 000b.5f55.3972 (bia 000b.46ca.6lc5) 
Internet address is 192.168.4.10/24 
DotllRadiol is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is 802.llA Radio, address is 000b.46ca.6lc5 (bia 
OOOb.46ca.6lc5) 
Switch 2: 
Mac Address Table 
Vlan Mac Address Type Ports 
-----------
1 0002.5573.2024 DYNAMIC Fa0/3 
1 0012.d96f.db39 DYNAMIC Fa0/2 
Total Mac Addresses for this criterion: 2 
is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is Fast Ethernet, address is 000c.30df.a282 (bia 
oooc.30df.a282) 
switch2# 
interface Vlanl 
ip address 192.168.5.11 255.255.255.0 
snmp-server engineID local 800000090300000C30DFA281 
snmp-server community public RO 
snmp-server community private RW 
end 
PIX Firewall 2: 
PIX2(config)# 
out 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.4.2 1 OTHER static 
out 192.168.4.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.4.1 1 CONNECT static 
inside 192.168.5.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.5.3 1 CONNECT static 
PIX2·(config) # 
PIX Version 6.3(4) 
interface ethernetO lOOfull 
interface ethernetl lOOfull 
nameif etherneto out securityO 
nameif etherneti 1nside securitylOO 
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hostname PIX2 
access-list ACLIN permit tcp any host 192.168.4.99 eq www 
access-list ACLIN permit icmp any any echo 
access-list ACLIN permit icmp any host 192.168.4.99 echo-reply 
access-list ACLIN permit tcp any host 192.168.4.98 eq www 
access-list ACLIN permit icmp any host 192.168.4.98 echo-reply 
ip address out 192.168.4.1 255.255.255.0 
ip address inside 192.168.5.3 255.255.255.0 
static (inside,out) 192.168.4.99 192.168.5.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 
0 
static (inside,out) 192.168.4.98 192.168.5.2 
0 
access-group ACLIN in interface out 
route out 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.4.2 1 
snmp-server host inside 192.168.5.1 
snmp-server community public 
snmp-server enable traps 
end 
PIX2(config)# 
3 in use, 3 most used 
TCP out 192.168.2.99:80 in 192.168.5.2:1048 
flags UIO 
TCP out 192.168.2.98:80 in 192.168.5.1:1054 
flags UIO 
TCP out 192.168.2.98:80 in 192.168.5.2:1050 
flags UIO 
PIX2(config)# 
2 in use, 2 most used 
Global 192.168.4.99 Local 192.168.5.1 
Global 192.168.4.98 Local 192.168.5.2 
PIX2(config)# 
out 192.168.4.2 0009.b76f.ad60 
inside 192.168.5.2 0002.5573.b23c 
inside 192.168.5.l 0002.5573.098b 
PIX2(config)# 
netmask 255.255.255.255 
idle 0:00:21 Bytes 1255 
idle 0:00:56 Bytes 1255 
idle 0:00:06 Bytes 1255 
0 
0 
static (inside;out 192.168.4.99 192.168.5.1 n~rm~Qk ?~~.?~~.?~~.?~~ O 
0 
static (inside,out) 192.168.4.98 192.168.5.2 netmask 255.255.255.255 0 
0 
PIX2(config)# 
interface ethernetl 11 11 is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is i82559 ether~et, address is 0012.d96f.db39 
IP address 192.168.5.3, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
PIX2(config)# 
interface ethernetO "out" is up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db38 
IP address 192.168.4.1, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 
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Router 2: 
router2 
hostname router2 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
ip address 192.168.3.2 255.255.255.0 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
ip address 192.168.4.2 255.255.255.0 
router rip 
network 192.168.3.0 
network 192.168.4.0 
snmp-server community public RO 
snmp-server community private RW 
snmp-server enable traps tty 
end 
router2 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B -
BGP 
C 192.168.4.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/0 
R 192.168.2.0/24 [120/1] via 192.168.3.1, 00:00:04, Serial0/1 
C 192.168.3.0/24 is directly connected, Serial0/1 
router2# 
Protocol Address Age (min) Hardware Addr Type Interface 
Internet 192.168.4.99 26 0012.d96f.db38 ARPA 
FastEthernet0/1 
Internet 192.168.3.2 000c.30e2.c620 ARPA 
FastEthernet0/0 
Internet 192.168.3.l 38 oooc.309e.6480 ARPA 
FastEthernet0/0 
Internet 192.168.4.1 12 0012.d96f.db38 ARPA 
FastEthernet0/1 
Internet 192.168.4.2 OOOc.30e2.c621 ARPA 
FastEthernet0/1 
up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is AmdFE, address is 000c.30e2.c620 (bia 000c.30e2.c620) 
Internet address is 192.168.3.2/24 
up, line protocol is up 
Hardware is AmdFE, address is OOOc.30e2.c621 (bia OOOc.30e2.c621) 
Internet address is 192.168.4.2/24 
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